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Abstract 
This thesis aims to analyze the fiscal equalization mechanism which is one of the 
most important instrument for interlocking the different layers of government with 
regard to financial transfer.  
 
In the first part, I review some important theoretical aspects of equalization that 
have been debated over the second half of the 20th century. Most of academic 
discussion focused on the problem of migratory movement in an open market 
economy, the question of fiscal equity and the territorial externality and so on.  
 
The second part is devoted to comparative case studies on the actual fiscal 
equalization in three constitutionally federal countries: Australia, Germany and 
Switzerland. Although the principle of equalization remains the same, the formation 
and evolution of each system diverges due to institutional settings and the historical 
events which influence on the formula used for the calculation of pool and 
allocation. A comparison of subnational fiscal capacities before and after 
equalization reveal the performance of each system which permits to provide 
certain arguments and perspective for future development of fiscal equalization 
schemes. 
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Introduction 
Nowadays, most of developed countries implement fiscal equalization to provide 
financial resource to subnational governments under certain forms of 
intergovernmental grant. The effective transfer can be organized vertically from the 
central to the subnational levels or horizontally between the governments of the 
same level. The size of fiscal equalization transfer remains modest around 2.3 
percent of GDP and varies 0.5 to 3.8 percent of GDP or 1.2 to 7.2 percent of 
government expenditure (Blöchliger et al., 2007, p.6). However, the equalization 
transfer has become an important resource for financing the local public goods and 
service. In comparison to other intergovernmental transfers, fiscal equalization is 
both economically and politically accepted due to its clear scheme. 
 
Since 1950s, the theory of fiscal equalization mechanism has been developed into 
a rich literature which results in different interpretations and applications in 
practice. The first paper on fiscal equalization raising the critical debates around the 
issue is published by James M. Buchanan (1950). In following years, other 
economists such as Anthony D. Scott (1950, 1952), Robin Boadway, Frank Flatters 
(1982a, 1982b) and Richard Musgrave (1999) advanced their contributions on both 
the theoretical discussions and practical aspects which facilitates to clarify 
principles and implement of fiscal equalization.  
 
According to Economist Wallace E. Oates (2011, p.  18) « […] in economic term 
most if not all systems are federal». The fiscal equalization is commonly designed 
in constitutionally federal system with high level of decentralization. However, 
unitary countries are also interested in framing such an equalization mechanism 
according to their institutional settings. As in the case of Scandinavian nations, they 
are constitutionally unitary countries. However, they are de facto becoming more 
decentralized systems and implement fiscal equalization as well. After the fall of 
the communist system, Eastern European countries have been changing from a 
centralized to decentralized management of public sector. From this point of view, 
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fiscal equalization is inspired by Eastern European governments to fulfil the process 
of fiscal decentralization.  
 
In regard to the current economic crisis, a number of economists such as de Grauwe 
(2010, 2012), Rossi and Dafflon (2012) have recently argued in favor of fiscal 
equalization to complete the economic and monetary union. When a group of 
countries relinquishes voluntarily their own monetary policies to form a new 
monetary institution, this will leads to a loss of an important tool to deal with the 
macroeconomic policy, especially during the crisis time. Consequently, the 
Member States governments can only reply on the fiscal policy to support the 
demand side. However, as Member States are bound to budgetary constraints of the 
Maastricht Treaty, they would be found in difficult condition to handle taxing and 
spending. The transfer from equalization fund can serve as an instrument to transfer 
fiscal resource from the less affected to most affected Member States. 
 
When people participate in a common market, they would have incentive to share 
certain common goods which benefit all the members of union. Evidence of 
European Union shows that the intra-branch trade is becoming dominant over inter-
branch trade which means that European countries exchange increasingly similar 
products of the same sector (Mathilde et al., 2007, p.314). Therefore, it is legitimate 
to produce certain common goods which benefice all citizen within the economic 
union at a shared cost.  Moreover, when the free movement of person and capital is 
assumedly perfect, some economic distortions would occur for the reason that the 
tax bases is on moving from one Member State to another. Consequently, there 
would be a loss of tax revenue for the country from which the tax base departs and 
an increasing of tax revenue in another. Thus, the equalization allows to reestablish 
fiscal equity in term of budget transfer between members of highly decentralized 
union. 
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Chapter 1 The theory and debate on 
fiscal equalization 
 
1.1 Problem of fiscal residuum under fiscal federalism 
 
The two famous working papers of economist James Buchanan were published in 
1950s where he, for the first time, discussed about the fiscal equalization. The 
starting point for his analysis is the concept of fiscal equity between regional 
governments in a federal system where most of the budgetary responsibilities are 
assigned to subnational governments. His most robust saying is: «Do not treat 
equals unequally ». Then, he advanced his argument that the place of residence is 
not the reason to discriminate individuals in term of taxation. James Buchanan 
presented his model coupled with six following hypothesis: 
 
 Individual income is uniquely determined by productivity; 
 Individual tax is progressive at federal level: 5 percent and 10 percent; 
 Individual tax is proportional at regional level: 10 percent; 
 There is no spillover effect;  
 Two pure public goods: One at the federal and another at two regional 
levels;  
 Budgets are balanced at two levels. 
 
Table 1.1 Numeric example of James Buchanan’s model 1 
Contributors Central F Region A Region B Total 
Resident Income Rate Revenue Rate Revenue Rate Revenue Paid tax 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
A1 10’000 10 1’000 10 1’000   2’000 
A2 10’000 10 1’000 10 1’000   2’000 
A3 1’000 5 50 10 100   150 
B1 10’000 10 1’000   10 1’000 2’000 
B2 1’000 5 50   10 100 150 
B3 1’000 5 50   10 100 150 
Total 33’000  3’150  2’100  1’200 6’450 
                                                          
1 In the original version of Buchanan’s model, he uses a progressive tax scale. Dafflon (2009) argues 
that applying a proportional scale does not change the nature of problem with regard to fiscal 
residuum. 
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Source: Adapted from Buchanan (1950) by Dafflon, (2009), translation. 
 
As given in the example of table 1.1: A federal country with one central entity and 
two regions A and B. In practice, the central is identified as federal level and the 
regions are states, canton, regions or landers. Inhabitants are endowed with 
productivity as the only source of income and can be classified into two groups of 
labor productivity: High and low. Individuals with high productivity get a higher 
salary at 10.000 and individuals with lower productivity get 1.000 monetary units.  
 
The region A has two inhabitants with high-productivity and one with low-
productivity. Whereas, the region B has one inhabitant with high productivity 
inhabitant and two with low productivity.  The individual productivity and the 
distribution of individual income are identical in both regions, the only thing that 
makes the difference is their places of residence. The central government applies a 
progressive scale of income tax which imposes a rate of 10 percent on the incomes 
of high productivity inhabitants and 5 percent on those of low productivity 
inhabitants. The regional governments impose a proportional rate of 10 percent to 
all inhabitants of any income. In this way, the taxing system is considered equal in 
term of contributive capacity.  
 
However, this situation changes when we take into account that the total tax serves 
to finance two kinds of public goods. The central public goods or pure public goods 
which are produced by the central government and provide equal benefits to all 
inhabitants. Meanwhile, the local public goods provide benefits exclusively to the 
residents of each region. Consequently, table 1.2 column (3) shows that inhabitants 
of the region A benefit from the central public goods plus local public goods for a 
total amount 5 250 and inhabitants of the region B derive benefit of 4 350 monetary 
units. By subtracting the total benefit to the total tax, the fiscal residuum of 
inhabitant in the region B is higher than those of the region A. This result is unequal 
in term of fiscal equity because inhabitants of the region A benefit from a lower 
fiscal residuum than those of region B even though they have identical incomes and 
fiscal system.  
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Table 1.2 Differences of fiscal residuum and payment requirement 
Region Total Taxes Total benefit Fiscal residuum Required transfer Net result 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A1 2’000 3’150+2’100=5’250 3’250 -300 2’950 
A2 2’000 3’150+2’100=5’250 3’250 -300 2’950 
A3 150 3’150+2’100=5’250 5’100 -600 4’500 
B1 2’000 3’150+1’200=4’350 2’350 +600 2’950 
B2 150 3’150+1’200=4’350 4’200 +300 4’500 
B3 150 3’150+1’200=4’350 4’200 +300 4’500 
Source: Adapted from Buchanan (1950) by Dafflon (2009), translation. 
 
In referring to the above example, equalization mechanism should be implemented 
to attain the goal of fiscal equity. Individuals with identical incomes (A1, A2 and 
B1) should obtain the same fiscal residuum when a fiscal transfer is made from the 
region A to the region B with an amount of 600, respectively for A3, B2 and B3. 
 
In his discussion about possible solutions, James Buchanan (1950, p. 598)  argues 
that applying another income tax progression or another measure for the 
redistribution of public goods at the federal level cannot change the result because 
the central government applies a tax discrimination in order to redistribute income 
between individuals. Residents of region A known as A1 and A2 have to pay 1 300 
in tax to the central government in order to finance the central public goods and the 
transfer (1 000+300), while B1 with the same income pays only 400 in net value 
(federal tax of 1 000-600 for equalization subvention). Likewise, the individual with 
the lower income: A3 have to pay 650 in which 50 is paid for the federal public 
goods and 600 for the redistribution to B1, B2. Meanwhile, B1 and B3 receive a net 
subvention of 250 where 50 for the federal public goods and -300 for the subvention 
for equalization transfer to reestablish the fiscal residuum. We recognize that how 
the federal law can discriminate horizontally the economic agent with the same 
situation before paying the tax (A1, A2, B1) or vertically (because A3 with less 
income in region A might pay more federal tax than A1, A2, for the redistribution 
policy to region B). Face to this major problem, it may need a constitutional 
interdiction to avoid the tax discrimination.  
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Another solution is that some kind of equalization transfer should be in place of a 
constitutional reform which might take a long time to be done while the internal 
redistribution policies are schemed by each region independently. As following, the 
result can be changed by a rearrangement at the regional level, a modification of 
regional tax rate or another measure for the redistribution of local public goods. 
However, if the local public good and service are financed by the user-payer 
principle, there is no need for equalization transfer because the fiscal residuum will 
be reduced until zero as the inhabitant receive the «value» of local public goods 
exactly equal to the «public price» as he pays.  
 
Richard Musgrave (1963) commented that the obtained result by James M 
Buchanan’ model depends on the manner by which the benefit of public goods and 
service are distributed. In applying the principle of equivalence at the local level, 
there would have no need for equalization. This indicates surely that the differences 
are generated from the choice of financing of regions.  When the equivalent 
principle is ignored and passed to criteria of contributive capacity, then the choice 
on the form of tax and de degree of progressivity which is the option of local public 
finances:  So for categories which use the principle of equivalence should not be 
compensated.  
 
Equalization transfer in this model is neither for the goal of redistribution of income 
between region A to B nor a fiscal gift to region B or transfer from a rich region to 
a poor region in the sense of redistributive policies where the poor region receives 
such payment for the reason of its disfavored economic conditions.  The real 
objective of this system is to reestablish fiscal equity between individuals having 
identical financial capacities.   
 
Although the simple model of James Buchanan is quite restrictive to certain 
hypothesis, the necessity for such an equalization mechanism is broadly accepted. 
However, some further questions should be answered such as how to calculate the 
value of local public goods and what kind of tax should or should not be taken into 
the formula. This becomes more complicated when many tax resources are taken 
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into account at the same time because each tax category need to be standardized 
before being aggregated. Moreover, in order to transform the theory to concrete 
application of fiscal equalization, there are some other questions should be 
answered on how to apply the individual principle of fiscal equity to equalization 
between subnational levels, which economic indicators are used to measure inter 
regional inequality and what are possible strategic behaviors of regional 
governments to obtain the largest transfer payment. 
 
1.2 Academic debates on the equalization  
 
Following the publication of James M Buchanan’s paper, there was a number of 
academic debates on the implementation and possible effects of fiscal equalization. 
Most arguments focus on the migratory movement in an open market economy, 
vertical and horizontal equity, inter-jurisdictional spillover effect and risk-sharing 
function of equalization transfer.  
 
1.2.1 On migratory movement in an open market 
 
An open market without intervention of public sector is likely to mal-function, there 
is no particular reason to confirm that a free market can direct the allocation of 
resource between regions to be efficient. Under this aspect, how the equalization 
transfer contribute to improve the result by leading to higher market efficiency? 
Anthony Scott (1952) advanced the argument that the transfer from the «rich 
regions» to «poor regions» through equalization mechanism allows the latter to 
produce a package of local public goods at a price which is equal to the fiscal 
residuum. This is a deformation of the price mechanism in a market economy. 
These kinds of transfer may bring about a distortion of resource allocation between 
regions and delay, as well as possibly discourage labor mobility between them. His 
argument remains strongly at the center of debate in an economy of globalization 
and the validity of his argument is pertinent: Urban centers with a high level of 
economic productivity cannot be punished by a financial equalization which 
increases economic activity of periphery collectivities. In reality, certain regions 
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have a large number of a financially strong contributors representing for their 
economic efficiency in term of the quality of local public goods and the fiscal price. 
However, he also noticed that without an equalization transfer, economic agents are 
under pressure and forced to exit the poor region and migrate to the region with a 
strong economic development, so that setting up such a transfer aiming at providing 
the poor region a packet of local public goods, at least at the minimum level in 
certain important domains such as education and public health, to deliver 
inhabitants in the poor region a choice.  
 
James Buchanan (1952a, 1952b) underlined that such an equalization mechanism 
is commonly accepted according to ethical standard. He also contested the idea that 
the transfer from the «more developed regions » to the « less developed regions» 
delays the resource allocation toward better utilization. Equalization transfer will 
not hamper the efficiency objective. Whereas, such transfer will delay inefficient 
migration due to the unequal treatment of equals. In his sense, local public budgets 
without a corrective measure are factors of distortion because the migration 
incentives take root uniquely on the base of local fiscal system by which residents 
locally compare his tax burden to the benefit that they receive from local public 
goods and services. As a result, this will interrupt the allocation of production 
factors according to their marginal productivities. In other words, the difference 
between the local public budgets deforms the calculations on which the migration 
decisions are taken.  
 
Another important aspect is that the concept of «poor region» or «less developed 
regions» must be defined concisely: They are poor because they do not acquire 
enough fiscal resources or gain low income per capita. So that, there is no potential 
for development of regional economies. In certain case, inter-regional policy under 
some kind of collaboration or fusion between near-by collectivities can set the way 
for regional economy to take off. 
 
In referring to the fiscal burden, residents in richer regions attract more benefit from 
the public goods and services, then more important part of the public expenditure. 
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Put differently, with the same fiscal burden on the two regions, the rich region have 
a higher fiscal capacity than the poor regions. They also dispose more fiscal 
resource, so that the rich region can provides more the supplementary public goods 
and services to their inhabitants. This fiscal difference should be compensated 
because it influences the migration of economic agents in order to prevent the 
migration movement of the inhabitant from the poor region to the rich region for 
the only reason of fiscal opportunism. According to Richard Musgrave (1952), the 
choice of migration is not only based on the fiscal difference but also on other 
factors that affect the migration decision of economic agents, therefore this 
difference is not considered as a factor of distortion of resource allocation. The same 
opinion on the arrangement of fiscal federalism is clear as the federal system is 
found on the idea of respecting the autonomy of locality. The consequence the 
migration choice may be regrettable at certain limit, however this is the 
characteristic of federal system that should be accepted.  
 
Robin Boadway and Frank Flatters (1982) advanced their works with arguments 
rooting from the allocative efficiency to support the fiscal equalization. Allocation 
of production factors is optimal if there is not any geographic reallocation of factors 
possible to increase the aggregated production. This spatial argument depends 
widely on the definitive mobility of production factors between jurisdictions, 
especially, the mobility of labor factor.  In absence of migration cost, they change 
their resident places when their individual income is higher in the new locality.  
 
 
Box 1.1 Choice of mobility 
(1) (WA + FRA) ≥ (WB - Cost of migration or social cost + FRB): Gain 
respecting to equalization. 
(2) If (WA + FRA) < (WB - Cost of migration or social cost + FRB) then 
immigrate from A to B. 
Where: 
W is salary on the labor market and FR is fiscal residuum. 
Source: Dafflon (2009), translation. 
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With W is defined as the salary on the labor market, A and B are two local 
collectivities, then the choice of mobility can be described in the box 1.1. In case 
that there is no migration cost, then equation (1) is verified by the sign «=», so that 
there exists a long-term migration equilibrium. An efficient allocation expects that 
marginal productivities of individuals on the labor market must be equilibrium since 
individual salaries are identical for both two employees with equal productivities 
(WA =WB). It is clear that the equation is only satisfied if FRs in both region are 
equal or zero, however this case is not evident in the reality. If the fiscal residuum 
in B is higher than in A, then such a gap will attract individual in the region A to 
immigrate to the region B. As a result, it would harm to the private allocative 
efficiency. In another case, with the effect on the salary, the labor force finds the 
wage as a reason to leave A, then arrive in B. Consequently, the equalization 
transfer would serve to equalize the fiscal residuum among both regions. Moreover, 
another problem is that the labor market is a national dimension in which there is 
no restraint to the movement of labor force, the compensation of equalization 
transfer is for the goal that the decision of mobility would be taken in respecting to 
the marginal productivities of labor and capital. It comes up with a case which is 
extreme rare in the public sector where there is no trade-off between goals of 
efficiency and equity and the two arguments reinforce to each other. Nevertheless, 
it should absolutely distinguish the situation where WA ≠ WB for the individuals with 
identical productivities due to the fraction on the labor market, such a situation does 
not require necessarily any equalization. For Robin Boadway and Frank Flatters, 
the point of reference is always the unitary system. It means that the financial 
equalization is served for the objective to reestablish at the central level an equitable 
taxing and efficacy. We can deduce that examining the root of inefficiency and 
inequity is inspired by the side of decentralization (Robin Boadway et al., 1998). 
 
When a person moves from one region to another, there are some possible cost 
Robin Boadway (2003), Mansoorian and Myers (1993) that should endure such as 
economic cost of delocalization, social cost, changes of social place and school or 
certain effect of capitalization of property price. The fiscal residuum of destination 
region would be higher than the fiscal residuum of departure region plus the 
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immigration cost and capitalization.  The impact of these factors would probably 
discourage the migration and also reduce the need for the equalization according to 
the argument of efficiency. The question now turns into the dynamic of the model. 
The analysis is only implied situation quasi equilibrium with modification of 
marginal values. However, the process to reach this situation is not possible to be 
explained clearly ex ant. That is why, in reality, the fiscal equalization really should 
respect the basic principles. 
 
In absence of the application of the user-payer principle, the fiscal residuum in 
different regions of one federal country is neither identical nor equal to zero. The 
question is to know that if the equalization can be justified from the point view of 
migratory efficiency and to compensate these fiscal differences among regions, 
Robin Boadway and Frank Flatters studies lead to two conclusions: 
 
 In a market economy of decentralized federation, the assumption that the 
immigration decision taken by individuals will lead to a situation of efficient 
allocation of labor across regions is actually in question not only because of 
the migration process is  locally inefficient in the sense of satisfying the 
first-order social efficiency conditions but also globally inefficient; 
 In a decentralized federation, the self-interested government of one region 
will react in order to match the requirements of their residents without 
taking into account the consequence on other regions. From the point of 
view of higher level of government, the self-interested behavior of 
subnational government will lead to inefficient or/and inequity. 
 
Myers (1990) argues differently that for reaching to an optimal situation, it is not 
necessary for any intervention at the central level. In his model, economic rents are 
shared equally between individuals, so that local collectivities react in the strategic 
manner to maximize the welfare of their inhabitants. As following, Myers argued 
that local collectivities react to the differences of fiscal residuum and pay the 
transfers though voluntary collaboration with other local collectivities in order to 
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limit the migration. The voluntary transfers determine a Nash equilibrium of 
migration which is known as Pareto optimal. 
 
1.2.2 On vertical and horizontal equity      
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
In the 1960s, Richard Musgrave contested the necessity of such an equalization 
system for the same reason as James Buchanan: Equity. Firstly, the vertical equity 
and horizontal equity cannot be separated because the horizontal equity requires for 
the equal treatment of equals with regard to fiscality, while the vertical equity is 
based on ethic norm for the treatment of unequal. Secondly, Richard Musgrave 
argued that the first theoretical solution of James Buchanan by which the central 
government applies another progression of tax rate to discriminate vertically the 
equals is impractical.  Put differently, it depends on the method which is used to 
measure the value of the local and federal public goods and service. More clearly, 
there exists some way to interpret of what is called as equity. 
 
There are certain sound reasons to stress that the different layers of government 
should participate actively to implement a redistributive policy for the ethical 
fundamentals on behalf of their choice of certain economic justice. In this case, 
there is no objective reason to attribute to the central level or the regional level the 
predominance of this choice. In addition, if we admit that each level of government 
treat their residents equitably, the amount of fiscal treatment cannot be equal in term 
of monetary value. Return to this controversy, most recent, Richard Musgrave 
underline that there is no theoretical base which supports the predominant role of 
central government with regard to the choice of redistributive policy. James 
Buchanan completely agreed with Musgrave on the point that the redistribution 
between individuals or inter-individual redistribution should be attributed as a 
competence to the central entity. 
 
1.2.2.1 Vertical and horizontal adjustments to the difference of fiscal residuum 
Face to such a situation of migratory inefficiencies and fiscal inequities as being 
presented in the above discussions, the higher level of government should intervene 
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by using some types of equalization transfers. For Robin Boadway and Frank 
Flatters, there are two possibilities to correct these fiscal residuum. 
 
1. An adjustment of tax rate at the central level: These authors proposed a set 
of modification where the federal government can react on the formula of 
personal income tax, so that the fiscal residuum can be minimized. This 
adjustment consists of three main changes as following: 
 Deduction of local fiscal residuum of taxable income at the central level; 
 Discrimination of the central tax rate in taking account these fiscal 
residuum; 
 Application the different tax scale at the central level to the different regions 
following their fiscal residuum. 
 
2. A financial equalization between regions with a higher fiscal residuum per 
inhabitant and regions with lower fiscal residuum. These authors admitted 
that the fiscal equalization is justified only on the fiscal equity between 
persons which is largely accepted, while the notion of fiscal equity between 
regions has not the justification itself. Nevertheless, these authors stated 
that: 
 The calculation of fiscal residuum is extremely difficult and costly even 
controversial. As a consequence, an aggregate at local level is easier to 
calculate and put in place for a practical solution; 
 An adjustment on the base of the tax is very difficult to apply because of a 
discretionary fiscal treatment to the contributor by the central level in diver 
regions and their residence would unavoidably violate the equality before 
the law as indicated in national constitutions; 
 The sovereign decision of local governments in applying a redistributive 
policy according to vertical and/or horizontal interpersonal transfer will 
equalize the fiscal residuum between their residents. Since the fiscal equity 
does not exist for putting an end to the fundamental of decentralized 
decision on the regional redistributive arrangement, it is enough to underline 
that the equalization improves potentially the position of individuals while 
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the local collectivities keep back their autonomy to realize or not this 
improvement. So that, equalization is neutral from this point of view and 
respects the autonomy of regions. 
 
1.2.2.2 Fiscal equity in large sense and strict sense 
Beside above proposed solutions where the unitary system is served as a point of 
reference, Robin Boadway and Frank Flatters also clarify two concept of horizontal 
equity in large sense and strict sense under the context of fiscal federalism, 
particularly the reform of fiscal equalization in Canada. 
 
If individual incomes are equals before imposition, they should be also equal after 
the fiscal treatment at the local, region, state, central and so on. The concept of the 
equity in large sense requires that each individual with the financially identical 
situation should be equally treated in term of fiscal residuum by all level of 
government. Taking an example of a federation with three level of governments, 
the extent of the reasoning for strict equity signified that individual are equal after 
the intervention of local level, they should also be equal after the intervention of the 
regional level, and then the central level”. 
 
The equity in large sense is presented in graphic 1.1: Assuming a federation with 
three municipalities A, B, C where A and B belong to the region I and C to the 
region II. Given the municipalities A, B of the region I and the municipality C of 
the region II provide a package of «local public goods-taxes» resulting in the 
individual fiscal residuum FRi which is different from one municipality to another 
and from one level of government to another. Considering a contributor type “i” 
who has the same economic capacity regardless he resides in A, B or C.  If there is 
a difference on the fiscal and budget position of one economic agent residing in A 
to another economic agent residing in B (with the hypothesis that the place of work 
and residence overlap on the same municipality), this seem to be that the region I 
should make a compensation to equalize the difference of fiscal residuum in such a 
way that the fiscal residuum of the municipality A is equal to that of the 
municipality B. Likewise, taking into account the «local public goods + regional 
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public goods – tax paid to the local jurisdiction + region». If there are differences 
between residents with the same economic capacity with regard to fiscal residuum, 
the central government should make the compensation. 
 
Graphic 1.1 The horizontal equity in large sense 
 
If the fiscal residuum in A FRA > FRB ≠ FRC 
then the region I should compensate  in 
such a way that 
FRI < FR*I ≠ FRII 
the amounts are equal FRI+ FRA = FR*I + FRA   
If fiscal residuum between regions are FRA+I = FRB+*I ≠ FRC+II 
then, the central level should 
compensate  
 
FR central 
 
= FR central 
> 
Or 
< 
FR*central 
in such a way that  
FRA+I+ central = FRB+*I+ central = FR C+ II+ central 
the additioned fiscal residuum are equal 
Source: Dafflon (2009), translation. 
 
The equity in large sense is required to make certain equalization transfer in order 
to adjust the individual situations, so that the overlapping of different states 
«municipality + region + central» lead to a perfect horizontal equity between 
individuals. Tax contributors in the identical situation are found in the same 
situation after the intervention of three levels of government regardless their 
residential place. 
 
In the case of equity in large sense, the stacking of individual horizontal equity is 
strictly respected at all levels of government depicting aggregated situations in 
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which the fiscal residuum is different. In other words, economic agents, before the 
intervention of higher public power, will be treated in an equal manner within the 
municipalities where they reside. In the municipality A of graphic 1.1 for example, 
the fiscal position for one resident in the municipality A may be different to another 
who would be found in B or C. 
 
Graphic 1.2 The horizontal equity in strict sense 
Source: Dafflon (2009), translation. 
 
Whereas, the equity in strict sense is that if the individuals having the identical 
economic capacity are equal after the tax intervention of the local level, they should 
be also be equal after intervention of regional level (Robin Boadway and Frank 
Flatters 1982a). As showed in graphic 1.2, in the same way of reasoning as in the 
case of equity in large sense, the region I and II implement equal treatment of 
equals, but the stacking is as following: «municipality A+ region I» does not 
necessarily lead to the same final result as in «municipality B + region I» or 
«municipality C + region II».  At the federal level, equality of fiscal treatment to 
 
The local fiscal residuum in A FRA > FRB ≠ FRC 
then, add the regional fiscal residuum  FRI = FRI ≠ FRII 
so additioned amounts are unequal FRI+ FRA > FRI + FRB   
and between regions FRA+I = FRB+I ≠ FRII+ FRC 
at the central level FR central = FR central = FR central 
in such a way that FRA+I+ central ≠ FRB+I+ central = FRC+II+ central 
additioned fiscal residuum are unequal      
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contributors are initially «equals» registered strictly in the system «municipality + 
region + central», but not from one municipality to another or one region to another. 
 
Now, we have understood effectively the two clear situations where the horizontal 
equity in large sense demands for certain equalization transfers, while equity in 
strict sense combines the stacked differences so that one scheme of equalization is 
not sufficient.  The choice of these two concepts depends on the point of reference 
to judge the problem of horizontal fiscal equity. First of all, we need to know at 
what level to take action: Regional or federal level by which the equalization is 
operated through. If the concept of ethic is that the equal outcome regardless the 
place of residence, the equity in large sense serves as a measure.  In the case that 
the place of residence is legitimate as a regional endowment, then fiscal residuum 
is equalized by the central. So that, some non-economic judgments are in need to 
answer these questions. 
 
If local collectivities provide higher fiscal residuum to their inhabitants, they prefer 
surely the notion of horizontal equity in strict sense. Firstly, because they estimate 
that they have the property rights on these benefits due to their place of residence. 
Secondly, as they do not want to lose advantages of a favorable competition position 
to another local collectivities, so that they will estimate that the concept of equity 
in large sense destroy the incentive for improvements of local performance even if 
the favorable fiscal residuum that they get benefit due to the advantage of 
geographical location rather than their local choice or their efficient management 
of local public goods and services.  
 
1.2.2.3 Some problems of different fiscal regimes in a federation 
The above discussion clarifies both concepts of horizontal equity in large and strict 
sense under assumption that tax contributors reside, work and pay tax in the same 
local collectivity. Now, another problem arises if we intend to specify that the local 
collectivities providing the local public goods and levying their tax where the 
beneficiaries and tax payers are not perfectly overlapped.  
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Does one particular contributor only draw benefit of local public goods and services 
which are provided by his municipality or his residential region? If the answer is 
negative, so does he pay also to the municipality or region providing him with 
benefit of their public goods? Or moreover, is the municipality’s tax burden 
supported completely by their inhabitants or exported partially to another 
municipality or region? An example is that the Canton Geneva in Switzerland 
where inhabitants pay a half of their tax to the domicile municipality and a half to 
that of workplace: Does the contributor draws benefit exactly a half of public goods 
and service in the home municipality and a half in the municipality of workplace?  
If he answer is negative: There exists spillover effect or tax exportation. So, 
different fiscal systems in a country and even between municipalities in a specific 
region create serious problems requiring for fiscal equalization (Robin Boadway 
and Frank Flatters, 1982a).  It has to come up with a question: Who takes benefit of 
local public goods and who effectively pay local tax to finance these public goods 
and service? Do local collectivities have capacity to export the fiscal burden? Under 
hypothesis that the fiscal system is redistributive, so it is necessary to distinguish 
between the taxing by principle of residence and original of revenue. 
 
1.2.2.3.1 Taxing by principle of residence 
In a fiscal system where the tax is levied by the place of residence, inhabitant profits 
the public goods according to their paid tax. In general, there is not exportation of 
tax, such a system will lead following consequences on horizontal equity. The 
concept of horizontal equity demands an equalization of all fiscal residuum, so that 
the requirement for an equal equalization to the differences of all the fiscal residuum 
between equal individuals in the different local collectivities. In the situation of 
horizontal equity in strict sense, only the difference after intervention of local level 
is the object of equalization. But, there is only fiscal residuum which is created by 
the local collectivities, as a consequence, equalization is not necessary. Inhabitants 
of one collectivity finance completely the public goods and profit themselves these 
productions. 
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1.2.2.3.2 Taxing by principle of origin of income 
When tax is levied by this principle, it is unavoidable that one person resides 
possibly in one collectivity but does not profit the public goods even he has to pay 
tax to finance them just as the particular case is the tax on income of foreign 
persons.  Once again, we can pose the question what is the role of equalization in 
different concepts of equity. The taxing on original of income permits to levy tax 
on persons residing outside the local collectivity. Then, this exportation of tax 
permits the local collectivity an opportunity to provide higher fiscal residuum to 
their inhabitants. According to the notion of equity in large sense, public 
intervention has to be neutral for all level of government together. In order to apply 
this, an equalization of all of difference of fiscal residuum may be necessary. 
 
Likewise, the notion of equity in strict sense demands a certain measure of 
equalization because collectivities which have the exportable taxes acquiring higher 
fiscal revenues in comparison to the collectivities which do not have such a taxing 
capacity. Applying this principle to the fiscal system create the external effect 
especially in a small geographically small collectivities. As a consequence, the 
collectivities with higher fiscal residuum will not interfere to the problem of 
exported taxes because such intervention may result in a political disadvantage to 
the local authorities. But inhabitants of other collectivities support the burden. This 
leads to an inequality which should be equalized by an equalization transfer in 
which the portion of exported taxes serve as the base of calculation resulting the 
amount of equalization. The table 1.3 sums up the problem relating this issue. 
 
Table 1.3 Need of equalization from the point of view on equity 
Equity 
Taxing by principle of 
residence 
Taxing by principle 
Of original of income 
in large 
sense 
Equalization of all fiscal 
residuum 
Equalization of all fiscal 
residuum 
In strict 
sense 
No need for equalization 
Equalization only the exported 
potion of income 
Source: Boadway and Flatters (1982a) adapted by Dafflon (2009), translation. 
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1.2.3 On territorial spillover effects on the budget of the local jurisdictions 
 
Under the decentralization in providing the local public goods and service, we 
recognize two types of territorial spillover effect deriving from the production and 
consumption of local public goods: The spillover of production appears when the 
production of local public goods in a particular region creating effect on adjacent 
regions, while the inhabitants of the later do not participate to the cost of production. 
Another case is the spillover of consumption in which the local public goods 
provided by one region may be consumed by inhabitant of adjacent regions who 
move to the region of provision in order to take advantage of public goods and 
services without paying or being excluded from consumption. These types of 
spillovers lead to a consequence on the budget and taxation of regional 
governments, equalization can therefore be justified. 
 
In the case where the definitive mobility of individuals generates negative spillover 
effect on the budget of departure region. For a constant local budget, the individual 
fiscal burden in the region from which they quit will increase because there is one 
less tax contributor. Whereas, the individual fiscal burden of the region of 
destination to which the tax contributor come will decrease. Thus, there exists an 
external effect associated to the individual decision of migration. In reality, this 
effect is ignored by the individual economic agent who is only influenced by the 
differences between regions respecting to the average cost and benefit of public 
goods and service and do not taking in account the social marginal cost relating to 
their private decision. Consequently, basing on this argument, the equalization 
permits to internalize the external cost.  
 
These circumstances lead to the following context: If the migration creates the 
territorial spillover effect, the destination region should restrain the coming of new 
inhabitants or apply a price discrimination between residents and new comers. If 
these two solutions are costly or impossible, an equalization transfer from the 
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destination region to the departure region should be set in operation because that 
the individual fiscal price decreases in the first and increases in the second. 
 
In addition, there is another consequence arising from cost of spillover effect 
emerges. When the cost is created by spillover effect, the theoretical solution 
considers that the departure region is obligated to compensate the destination region 
for the cost of the new comers as a consequence of the migration movement. The 
departure region may refute that she has already supported a higher fiscal price for 
the reason that there is one less tax contributor. Moreover, because the tax payer 
has not belonged to their jurisdiction anymore, so there is no reason to require them 
for compensation of cost. Whereas, it should obligate the destination region support 
totally the cost of spillover effect. As a result, the problem passes from a geographic 
neutrality of equalization transfer to a concept of regional policy. 
 
1.2.4 Risk-sharing function  
 
Most recently, the fiscal equalization is considered as an insurance proxy to 
stabilize the economic shocks which local collectivities endure during the spiral 
economic cycle. With the intergovernmental transfers, the local economy can 
absorb partially the negative consequence on their economic space. So the positive 
effect of transfer is significant to parry these shocks.  
 
As the traditional economic theory explains that a local collectivity is specialize 
relatively in certain domain that are sensible to economics specific shocks of down 
turn or sectorial conjuncture. If the capital market is perfect, consumers can 
individually insure themselves against the shock touching their collectivities and 
negative effects lessening their income. The insurance market distributes the risks 
through the primes covering the eventual sinister, then this mechanism permits 
maintaining a level of comparable consummation over the country and timeline. 
When the risk is realized, insurance would sustain the insufficient income. If the 
market is incapable to insure this kind of risk, risk inverse individual cannot obtain 
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a higher utility. Then, the local collecitivties can unit into one package so called 
risk pooling for the local risks. 
   
In a monetary union where the price and the salary are relatively rigid and the 
productions factors are immobile. The intergovernmental transfers serve as an 
instrument of adjustment.  In case of income shock, an individual collectivity as a 
member of union cannot depreciate the exchange rate to reestablish his competitive 
situation because of the absence of monetary instrument. The equalization can play 
a crucial role not only sustain partially the loss of income but also secure the basic 
public services of the local public sectors. 
 
Some empirical researches such as Atkeson and Bayoumi (1993), Persson and 
Tabellini (1996), David Wildasin (1996), John Lockwood (1999) and Sam 
Bucovetsky (1998) analyze the role of intergovernmental transfer as a mechanism 
for risk sharing for macroeconomic policy in national or economic union space. The 
principal reason is that when the spatial shock occurs, it will results in a quick fall 
of economic activities, then regional income in certain sectors of regions. In this 
case, the financial aid insured by the equalization funds is vertically and 
horizontally transferred from the central government or/and from the regions of 
strong economic activities which are not touched by the shock toward the regions 
which are severely affected by the economic shock. In this sense, a group of 
measure in equalization transfer will serve to absorb partially the shock which is 
localized temporally or geographically. It should distinguish two arguments of 
macroeconomic stabilization based on the demand side theory of John Maynard 
Keynes. These equalization instruments is not for the objective of slipping the 
conjectural cycle in all regions of the country, but to find out a mechanism to help 
the regions which support particularly a crisis or a brutal event because an economic 
shock spirals these regions to a difficult situation in comparison to the average 
situation of other regions at the same level. The same reasoning is also valid for the 
economic union including member states and a supranational government. 
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Usher (1977) was quite skeptic about the dimension of equalization in his advanced 
developments. The insurance mechanism implies that the present contributors 
would be the beneficiaries later. The example of Canada shows that there is not 
significant change in the relative positions of Canadian provinces over a 
longstanding equalization mechanism. Certain empirical evidences, for example 
Buettner (2002), von Hagen (2000) reveal that an assurance against spatial shock 
through equalization transfer is not evidently necessary. Moreover, local 
collectivities are better informed on what is concerned the demand and the cost of 
local public goods and services Lockwood (1999) in such a way that permit them 
to estimate the optimal transfer of equalization. The central level should take in 
account the information asymmetry which is the more and more integrated in 
theoretical analysis of equalization. 
 
1.3 Other reasons which justifies the equalization 
 
Besides the reasons used to justify equalization such as migratory movements, 
geographical equity, spillover effect and risk-sharing, there are other reasons which 
are most cited to advocate such an equalization transfer. 
 
1.3.1 Stability of a federation 
 
It is certain that becoming a member of union forms certain advantage for 
collectivities as listed below: 
 
 Economic gain in a free and common market where there is no barrier to the 
inter-trade of the union, free movement of labor force and goods and service 
in a federal state. 
 Economy of scale for the pure public goods then the cost is decreasing with 
the number increase such as: National defend, foreign relationship, common 
security. 
 Pooling the risk among the collective members which are heterogeneous 
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 Reinforce the negotiation position with others countries as the market is 
larger. 
 
However, these advantages do not often lead to a Pareto improvement because some 
collectivities may lose some functions which should be centralized in the hand of 
federal state. The equalization can correspondingly function as an instrument to 
rebalance and to share the benefit among collectivities. This may felicitate the 
formation of a new federation, reinforce the old federation or experiment the 
federation by integrating the new problem such as migration as in above analysis in 
which the equalization serves equally a tool to limit the inefficient migration from 
the poor collectivities to the rich collectivities in foundation of federated states. 
 
1.3.2 Nation, citizenship and regional economic convergence 
 
Organization of federal system roots from the decentralization of reasonable 
assignment of power on spending, taxing and decision making among levels of 
government. Most of public domains should be found on the subsidiarity principle, 
except for certain limited domains are delegated to the central government such as 
national security and foreign affairs, others public domain should be decentralized 
to subnational governments. As a result, the diversity in providing local public 
goods and service is preserved to meet the local preference (Wallace Oates, 2011, 
p.36). Equalization mechanism could play a role in keeping the unity in diversity 
and preventing intergovernmental conflicts and secessionist movements.  
 
When a territory or a country participates into a federation, the individual rights are 
guaranteed to all the citizens and the minimal standard of local public goods and 
services are ensured regardless the place of residence.  The access to these local 
public goods and service is the most often classified in a dimension known as 
citizenship and not on economic term of the decentralization. Moreover, there is 
also a form of equity which is distinct from the equity of fiscal residuum, but equity 
as being human. So, financial equalization serves also for the objective where it 
sustains some basic public functions to secure the dignity of humanity. 
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The financial equalization is also important tool to facilitate the economic and 
social convergence between different regions or/and accelerate the speed of 
economic convergence in a federation. These transfers sometimes play a critical 
role to construct economic infrastructures through public investment. For example, 
the solidarity program of Germany which is used to assist five former East German 
Landers to catch up the development level of others Landers. Another case is the 
financial transfer though the structural funds of European Union, however, these 
funds is not organized to function with regard to the theory of equalization. 
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Chapter 2 Fiscal equalization in 
Australia 
 
2.1 Institutional arrangement of the Australian Federation 
 
Australia is a special case of federation which is constructed on the base of the 
commonwealth system. After the period of British colonization, a new constitution 
has arranged Australia as a federation with six ex-colonized States and two 
Territories: Canberra known also as the Australian Capital Territory and Northern 
Territory are autonomous political entities whose powers are almost identical to 
others six States. There are seven small territories which also come under 
administration of federal government (the Commonwealth). 
 
Australia is a constitutional monarchy because of the influence of former system 
which was imposed by England. Queen Elizabeth is also the Head of the State and 
Queen of Australia, her representation is expressed by the governor general at the 
Commonwealth and a governor in each State of Australia. However, effective 
executive power is vested in the government leader: The prime minister who is 
usually the leader of one specific political party or political majority coalition in the 
House of Representative at the federal parliament, is appointed by the governor 
general. Likewise, each of Australian state is headed by a state Premier who is 
appointed by the state Governor. The state Premier is the leader of executive branch 
at the state level. 
 
Similarly other parliamentary systems, the Australian federal parliament consists of 
two houses, as do the parliaments of each State.  Except for the Queensland 
Parliament which has only one House and there is no legislative council. Members 
of federal parliament are elected by universal suffrages within their electoral 
jurisdictions for both the representatives and senators. There is no state which has 
fewer than five representatives and the Constitution stipulates that the total number 
of representatives must double the number of senators. The Senate is composed of 
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12 senators per State and 2 per territory. Senators can use their power to veto with 
respect to the legislation adopted by the House of Representative. In case of 
persistent disagreement between the two houses, the executive branch may dissolve 
them. 
 
The High Court of Australian consists of seven judges who are appointed by the 
federal cabinet. Their role is to settles constitutional disputes as a last resort. The 
federal legislation governing the High Court stipulates that the federal justice 
minister must consult his state counterpart before recommending court 
appointment. 
 
2.2 Assignment of public functions in Australia 
 
2.2.1 Assignment of competences 
 
The Australian Constitution assigns a large and various exclusive domains to the 
Commonwealth including national defense, internal and external trade, foreign 
affairs, disability pensions, social security, unemployment insurance and family 
allowance. There are several domains in which the States serve as agencies to 
execute the federal policies so-called administrative decentralization. However, it 
also indicates certain areas where both the Commonwealth and States enjoy 
concurrent competences, although the Commonwealth has a dominant role over the 
states and territories. There are two domains where the Commonwealth and States 
enjoying a sharing of responsibility are healthcare and education. The federal 
government plays a key role in financing private hospitals, childcare, post-
secondary education, waste collection, town planning. 
 
The Constitution does not explicitly mention which function is assigned to the 
States. However, the Section 107 of the Constitution grants the six former British 
colonies certain exclusive legislative competences over some areas which is not 
exclusively vested in the Parliament of the Commonwealth. In practice, the States 
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enjoy exclusive competences over public security, urban development, housing, 
transportation and public service.  
There are about 561 local governments in Australia under different nominations 
such as cities, shires, towns, or municipalities. However, the Constitution does not 
assign any exclusive power to them. Local governments are therefore subject to the 
legislative control of States and Territories. In reality, local governments are 
responsible for the community facilities such as libraries, parks, local road, and 
childcare.  
 
2.2.2 Taxing power  
 
The Australian Constitution confers distinct legislative jurisdiction to the federal 
and states parliaments with respect to taxation. In the next step, the States delegate 
partially taxing power to the local governments. Australia is therefore characterized 
by a high level of fiscal centralization from the point view of constitutional 
arrangement. 
 
In 2013-2014, the general government revenue was around AUS$ 540 billion in 
which the total portion of tax revenue raised by all three levels of government 
accounting for AUD$ 433.8 billion or 26 percent of GDP. The graphic 2.1 shows 
that the federal government collected 81.1 percent, while the States and 
Municipalities collected respectively 15.7 and 3.2 percent of total tax revenue. 
 
The federal government exercises exclusive control over certain important 
resources such as personal income tax, corporate income tax and goods and service 
tax (GST) 2. Most of revenues are derived from personal income tax for 44 percent, 
corporate income tax for 21 percent, the third largest revenue is from GST which is 
served as the main source for equalization transfer to the States. For the States, tax 
on property is the largest resource making up to 38 percent of their own revenue, 
followed by the payroll tax with 31 percent. For the Municipalities, their only 
resource is tax on property. 
                                                          
2 GST means goods and services tax or sales tax in Australia 
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Graphic 2.1  Tax revenue across three levels of governments in Australia 
Source: Calculated by author from www.abs.gov.au.  
 
2.2.3 Spending power 
 
In 2013-2014, the spending budget of three levels of government amounted to a 
total of AUD$ 564 billion, including the inter-jurisdictional sector and social 
security expenditure. The graphic 2.2 shows the share of spending across three 
levels of government in which the budget of federal government, including the 
transfer to States and Municipalities but without the social security and welfare 
expenses, was around AUD$ 406 billion or 71.9% of total public spending. The 
spending of States and Municipalities account for 22.3 and 5.8 respectively. 
 
The largest portion of spending is allocated to social security which reaches to 38 
percent or AUD$ 155 billion of the total budget of federal government. The second 
largest part of the federal budget is used to fund the States and Territories through 
the horizontal equalization mechanism which amounts to 19 percent. The spending 
on healthcare remains at the third largest part accounting for 16 percent. The 
spending on other functions including public funding to agriculture-forestry-
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fishery, mining-manufacturing-construction, transport and communication, 
economic affairs, housing-communities amenities and so on. For the States and 
Municipalities, the three categories of spending which absorbed most of their 
spending budget are: Healthcare for 30 percent, education for 24 percent and 
transport and communications for 12 percent3. 
 
Graphic 2.2 Breakdown of public spending in Australia 
Source: Source: Calculated by author from www.abs.gov.au. 
 
The fiscal arrangement in Australia creates a large vertical fiscal imbalance where 
there is a mismatch between the tax revenue of the federal government and its own 
expenditure. Consequently, States are heavily reliant on the transfers from the 
federal government. About 55 percent of state revenue is allocated from the federal 
budget: 32 percent is from the horizontal fiscal equalization and 23 percent is from 
specific purpose payment. In 2013-2014, the federal government collected about 81 
percent of total revenue resource when its expenditure is at 52 percent. At the same 
time, the States and Municipalities collect about 19 percent of revenue resource 
while they are responsible for 48 percent of public expenditure. Thus, the horizontal 
equalization serves also as a mechanism to rebalance the vertical imbalance which 
is however not compatible to the theory of equalization. 
 
                                                          
3 Consult more public spending statistics on www.abs.gov.au. 
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2.3 Horizontal fiscal equalization in Australia 
 
2.3.1 Early intergovernmental transfer 
 
Ten years after the formation of the Australian Federation, the new federal 
government has decided to introduce some special financial grants to former 
colonies by admitting that they had weaker financial positions as components of the 
commonwealth. These provisions were included in the Surplus Revenue Act 1910 
after a particular representation of Western Australia. As following the similar 
representation were made by Tasmania by which the newly established government 
obtaining passage of an Act to provide grant to this State as well. Consequently, 
during 1920s, South Australia jointed an appeal for a special grant from the 
Commonwealth. 
 
This issue became controversial over several years in the midst of economic and 
trade depression 1930s. The Western Australia intended to hold a referendum in 
seceding from the federation for the reason that there was unfair financial treatment 
or discriminate the equal States. The Prime Minister Joe Lyons visited Western 
Australia in order to mobilize for a negative voting on the secession. At the same 
time, he promised to establish a commission to consider grant to States. As a result, 
the majority has voted for a government which was against secession. In response, 
the Prime Minister Lyons proceeded to establish a Commonwealth Grant 
Commission (CGC) in 1933. 
 
2.3.2 Role of Commonwealth Grant Commission (CGC) 
 
From 1930s to 1960s, the role of CGC was to recommend to the federal government 
the extent of small, special grants which could be made to Tasmania, Western 
Australia and Western Australia. In the late 1950s, Queensland also successfully 
argued to the case that this State should be eligible for a special grant. In the 
collective spheres, these States became known as «claimants» States. Western 
Australia was not anymore in «claimant» position in 1968 at the moment when 
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mineral booms started. Tasmania, South Australia and Queensland remained this 
situation until 1970. 
 
From the historic point of view, Australian States remained strongly their fiscal 
autonomy as they levied its own resources and expenditures. The taxing power of 
federal government was introduced within the Second World War and became 
permanent. The payroll tax was introduced under the Menzies-Fadden government 
to finance the child endowment in 1941. In 1942, there were four Acts which have 
been passed through a voting at the federal parliament: The Income Tax Act, The 
Income Tax Assessment Act, The Income Tax and The State Grant. 
 
The consequence of the first three Acts was to facilitate the transfer of income tax 
power from the States to the federal government. The last one was to regulate the 
grants by federal government to States. At the end of the war, there were some 
claims for the return of income tax power to the States, however, the Prime Minister 
Chifley refused as Kingsley Laffer pointed out «It followed from the High Court’s 
unanimous declaration of the validity of the Income Tax Act and the Income Tax 
Assessment Act that even in peace-time the commonwealth can levy what rates of 
income tax it likes and that its collections have priority over state collections» 
(Laffer, 1942, cited in Wilkinton, 2003, p.9) 
 
Faced to the States claims on their tax revenues, federal government introduced the 
new legislation to provide grants to compensate them for the loss of income tax by 
«States Grant» (Tax Reimbursement) Act 1946. In 1959, this grant to the States was 
renamed to «Financial Assistance Grants» (FAGs) under Menzies government. In 
1970s, six states Premiers confronted the federal minister that they had certain 
difficulties over state revenue and argued to be able to levy income tax themselves, 
then presented with a manifesto entitled «The Financial Relationships of the 
Commonwealth and States». The Prime Minister Gorton refused to pay attention to 
the state reclamation, however, his successor William Mc Mahon was receptive, 
and then he decided to transfer the payroll tax to the State in 1971. In addition to 
this arrangement, the Commonwealth and States concluded an agreement in 1976 
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that there would be an assessment made of relative fiscal needs of all States. In 
1977, both levels of Australian government agreed to that the review would be 
based on horizontal equalization principle. As a result, an agreement designated 
CGC to undertake the calculation of amount allocated to States in 1978. Under the 
proposal of the CGC, the Commonwealth government decided to shift from its 
intention of returning one-third of tax coefficient of federal personal income tax to 
transferring one-third of all tax revenues levied by federal government, including 
personal income tax, sales tax, customs duties and excise tax to States. This form 
of assistance amounted from AUD$ 4.3 billion to AUD$ 6.3 billion in 1980-1981, 
then increased further to AUD$ 8.2 billion in 1981-1982 and to AUD$ 9.2 billion 
in 1982-1983. 
 
After being elected as prime minister in 1983, Malcolm Fraser decided to change 
the FAGs system back to the day where the States had its own income tax power as 
the colonies of Britain. Actually, Fraser intended to return one-third of federal 
income tax to the States. Even the next cabinet of Bod Hawke wanted to preserve 
this scheme, however, Peter Groenewegen noted «The May 1985, the Premiers 
conference abandoned this procedure… [and] restored the concept of financial 
assistance grant growing at a specified rate» (Wilkinson, 2003, p.4). The amount of 
financial assistance continued to increase even more over the time. In 1998-1999, 
this amount increased to AUD$ 16.8 billion.  
 
In 1999, with the difficulties of States over the issue of tax revenue and expenditure, 
the John Howard government introduced legislation entitled A New tax System 
providing both for the replacement of the federal wholesale tax by a good and 
service tax which was applied in July 2000 at a rate of 10 percent and a change to 
the previous system of federal financial assistance to the States. At the same period, 
the state Premiers came to conclude an Inter-government Agreement on The New 
Arrangement for Federal–State Financial Relations. With regard to the new scheme, 
the federal government provided no longer the financial assistance to the States as 
before, but a portion of federal revenue from GST which is now transferred to 
Australian States and there were 9 states taxes which were abandoned. The Clause 
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B2 of the Inter-government Agreement states that «The pool of funding to be 
distributed according to Horizontal Fiscal Equalization principles in a financial year 
will comprise GST revenue grants» (Treasury of New South Wales, 2000, cited in 
Wilkinton, 2003, p.5) 
 
2.4 The present system of fiscal equalization  
 
2.4.1 Principle of fiscal equalization in Australia 
 
The Australian Constitution does not provide any arrangement for the fiscal 
equalization, the principle is nevertheless given by the Federal-State Relation 
Agreement (FSRA). In order to determine the amount of financial assistance grant 
to a State, the CGC attempted to determine whether one State suffered a disability 
in comparison to another State in providing public goods and services to its own 
citizens. In the Agreement 1981 concluded by the Federal-State relation committee 
of Victorian Parliament has described the disability as following:  
 
«A factor…[that] require….[a state or territory government] to expend more or less 
than…[they] on average must spend, in other to achieve a particular object…or 
which reduce or increase …[a state or territory government’s] relative capacity to 
raise revenue from a given taxation effort» (Parliament of Victoria, 1998, cited in 
Wilkinton, 2003, p.6).  Although this phrase was expressed in general sense, factors 
of disability would be taken into considerations to express the capacity of providing 
public goods and services to its own citizen within the states boundaries. Experts of 
CGC made it clearer by giving certain example of disability factors which endured 
in Northern Territory. 
 
«[…] a population of only 170.000…quite evenly distributed over an area of 1.35 
million square kilometers…one-quarter of population is indigenous Australian 
Aborigines. The cost of providing schools, areas and other services to Aboriginal 
settlement in remote…often semi-desert are very high...the territory’s relative per 
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capita cost of service provision is nearly three times the average for the other 
Statess». (Richard Rye and Bob Searle, 1997 p. 158). 
 
The two examples make the meaning for the disability proceeding from the social 
geographic condition: One causes excessive cost of providing local public goods 
and service that a State or Territory must endure, another is the shortfall of revenue 
which is engaged to cover the local expenditure. Evenly, the method of calculation 
and pool of factor have been changed and reviewed, the CGC point out the fiscal 
equalization in its report in 2015 as following: 
 
«State governments should receive funding from the pool of goods and services tax 
revenue such that, after allowing for material factors affecting revenues and 
expenditures, each would have the fiscal capacity to provide services and the 
associated infrastructure at the same standard, if each made the same effort to raise 
revenue from its own sources and operated at the same level of efficiency».  
Commonwealth Grant Commission (2015) 
 
Previously, the CGC undertook a comprehensive review of its methods every five 
years (the latest review was published in 2004) and determined the amount of 
equalization transfer based on the five-year average relativity calculation. Since 
2010, the CGC has move to the three-year average period, for example the proposal 
for transfer of 2015-2016 is based on the three-year average relativity calculation 
of 2013, 2014 and 2015. The CGC argued that the changing of average period 
allows to «better balance the competing needs of capturing current state 
circumstances and providing stability» (Australian Government, 2012, p. 34). 
 
The CGC is designed as a dependent statutory advisory body and its members are 
appointed by the federal governments. CGC will choose social- geographic factors 
and natural factors which are outside the control of States. These factors may effect 
on the tax raising capacity, the expenditure and the cost function of States. Experts 
will qualify these factors which is used to figure out the amount that each State 
should receive and make the recommendations to the federal government. This 
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procedure makes the equalization system of Australia become unique due to the 
comprehensiveness on the international plan. As noted above that the equalization 
system of Australia is based on both assessment of fiscal capacity and expenditure 
need (or cost) for each State and the equalization payments are vertically and 
directly made by the Commonwealth government under proposal of the CGC and 
the Treasure of Australia to the States. 
 
2.4.2 Formulas of fiscal equalization 
 
2.4.2.1 The process of calculating the relativities and GST distribution to the States 
Since 1981, in order to calculate the amount of GST’s share to each State, the CGC 
has developed a complex method which results in a global index of fiscal capacity 
for each State. This index is named «relativity». The CGC defines the «relativity» 
as following: 
 
«If States had the same economic, social and demographic features and 
Commonwealth payments were distributed uniformly among them, the commission 
would recommend that the GST be distributed equally per person. Each State would 
be allocated the same (average) amount per resident. However some States are 
fiscally stronger than others — they have stronger tax bases, lower service delivery 
costs or receive above average commonwealth grants which mean that they need 
less GST revenue than other States if all States are to be fiscally equal.  That relative 
strength (or weakness) is measured by the State’s need for GST revenue compared 
to the average and is summarized in its relativity. A stronger State might be assessed 
as needing only 90 percent of the average GST — its relativity would be 0.9. A 
weaker State might be assessed as needing 110 percent of the average, its relativity 
would be 1.1» (Commonwealth Grant Commission, 2015, p.33). 
 
At the first stage: The calculation process of average relativity for each State 
proceed in four steps: 
 The CGC will collect and examine the historical data from the general 
government statement of all States. The figures of each State will be 
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adjusted before summing up according to their expense, net investment, net 
lending, own revenues, and other transfers from the Commonwealth;   
 The assessed budget of each State is calculated on how much more or less 
than the average each State would expense to provide the average service, 
invest to acquire the average stock of infrastructure, need to save to obtain 
the average stock of financial assets, raise their own revenue if it adopt the 
average tax policy and receive other transfers from the commonwealth. 
Consequently, a State’s assessed budget is the sum of its assessed expense, 
assessed own revenue, assessed net investment, assessed net lending and 
assessed other transfer;  
 Relativities are calculated by expressing each States assessed GST revenue 
requirement per capita as proportion of the average per capita GST for the 
year; 
 The per capita relativity of one State is the result of dividing its per capita 
assessed GST revenue requirement to per capita GST.  
The box 2.1 shows the mathematical presentation for calculation of 
relativities: 
 
Box 2.1   The GST distribution model – A mathematical presentation 
The budget identity:  
          Gs + Os + Rs – Es – Is = Ls          (3.1) 
The adjusted budget:  
          Gs = Es + Is + Ls – Rs – Os       (3.2) 
The assessed GST revenue requirement:  
    𝐴𝐺𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑖 = (𝑃𝑖
𝐸𝑠
𝑃𝑠
𝛾𝑖 + 𝑃𝑖
𝐼𝑠
𝑃𝑠
𝛿𝑖 + 𝑃𝑖
𝐿𝑠
𝑃𝑠
𝜀𝑖 − 𝑃𝑖
𝑅𝑠
𝑃𝑠
𝜌𝑖 −  𝑂𝑖)  (3.3) 
The per capita relativity: 
           𝐹𝑖 =
𝐴𝐺𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑖/𝑃𝑖
𝐺𝑠/𝑃𝑠
                         (3.4) 
 
Where:  
i, s Subscripts used to denote an individual State (i) or all States (s);  
P  population; 
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(Continued) 
E, I, L, R  Expense, net investment, net lending and own-source revenue 
respectively;  
γ, δ, ε, ρ  Assessed disability factors for expenses, net investment, net 
lending and own-source revenue respectively; 
G  GST revenue;  
O  Other Commonwealth payments. They are National Specific 
Purpose Payments (SPPs) and National Partnership Payments 
(NPPs) which the commission has decided should impact on 
relativities. They may also include Commonwealth own-purpose 
outlays which the commission treats as impacting on relativities.  
AGSTR  Assessed GST revenue requirement. The commission’s approach 
ensures States’ assessed GST revenue requirement total to the 
GST revenue available (∑i AGST = Gs);  
F  Assessed per capita relativity.  
Source: Commonwealth Grant Commission (2014). 
  
Where 
𝐺𝑠
𝑃𝑠
 is the average amount of GST revenue that each State would receive if 
they did not endure any disability, while 𝛾𝑖, 𝛿𝑖, 𝜀𝑖, 𝜌𝑖 present, respectively, the 
«assessed disability factors» for expenses, net investment, net lending, and own-
resource revenues of ith State which are put in relation with the average expenses, 
average of net investment, average of net lending and average of own resource 
revenues of all States. Oi is the other transfer per capita that the i
th State received 
from the Commonwealth.  
 
Two more important components 𝑃𝑖
Es
Ps
𝛾𝑖 and 𝑃𝑖
𝑅𝑠
𝑃𝑠
𝜌𝑖 are resulted from the 
calculation as following: Each expense/tax category is attributed to some disability 
factors so-called «category disabilities» which have an effect on the category in 
question. For example: The assessment of expense on secondary education is 
determined by assessed disability factors such as the lack of economy of scale, 
demographic and geographic factors and so on. Adding all the assessments of 
47 
 
 
 
expense category results the assessed expense. The same process is applied to 
determine other components. 
 
The CGC determines independently which category and its disability factors will 
be integrated in the assessment of state’s budget. Before the 2004 reform, there 
were 39 expenditure categories, most of them are divided into 171 components and 
344 disabilities. CGC makes a choice on 13 different tax categories and 8 user-
charge categories, some of them are divided in to subgroups extending to 29 sub 
categories in total. In 2010, CGC changed its method by taking into account of 7 
categories of taxes and 13 sub categories. On the expense side, there were 12 
expense categories, 43 components and 93 disabilities.  
 
At the second stage: The CGC’s recommended relativities are derived by averaging 
the relativities calculated for the most recent three years. Then, the average 
relativities will be put in relation with the national average and the total grant pool 
to result the share to each State.  The total grant pool is fixed by the Commonwealth 
government on the annual basic and the transfer to each State is determined due to 
following mathematical formula. 
 
       𝐺𝑖 =
𝐹𝑖×𝑃𝑖
∑𝐹𝑖×𝑃𝑖 
× Total Grant Pool      (3.5) 
Where 
Gi: GST share to State i 
Fi:  Three year average relativity per capita of State i 
Pi:  Three year average population of State i 
∑Fi*Pi: The three year average relativity of Fi State multiply to its three year 
population Pi. There are 6 States and 2 Territories included in the 
calculation. 
 
2.4.2.2 Results of GST distribution 
For 2015, the average GST revenue per capita is at AUD$ 2 370, while the total 
assessment for each State varied largely from AUD$ -1 656 (the sign « - » means 
the State require less) in Western Australia to AUD$ 10 883 in Northern Territory. 
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Consequently, the GTS requirements differ widely from one State to another as 
being showed in the table 2.1. To be simple, I ignore other assessments and consider 
only two important assessments which contribute mainly to the fiscal disparity of 
GTS revenue requirements of States are revenue capacity assessment and expense 
needs assessment. 
 
Table 2.1 Budget assessment and GST revenue requirement-2015 
 NSW Vic Qld WA SA Tas ACT NT Ave 
 $pc $pc $pc $pc $pc $pc $pc $pc $pc 
Average GST revenue 
Plus assessed differences in: 
Expenses 
Investment 
Net lending 
Revenue 
Transfers other than GST 
Total assessed differences 
2’370 
 
-327 
-70 
11 
213 
57 
-116 
2’370 
 
-803 
-12 
-2 
560 
10 
-246 
2’370 
 
329 
-5 
-4 
-9 
-15 
313 
2’370 
 
856 
384 
-42 
-2845 
-8 
-1’656 
2’370 
 
179 
-197 
23 
935 
-77 
863 
2’370 
 
1’016 
-370 
42 
1’342 
-73 
1’958 
2’370 
 
-482 
-128 
-1 
731 
127 
248 
2’370 
 
10’978 
686 
-3 
337 
-1’115 
10’883 
2’370 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Total 2’254 2’123 2’682 714 3’233 4’328 2’617 13’252 2’370 
Source: Commonwealth Grant Commission (2015). 
 
Revenue capacity assessment: Australian States are composed of jurisdictions with 
a large difference in revenue capacity. State’s revenue capacity assessments range 
from AUD$ 1 342 in Tasmania to AUD$ 2 845 in Western Australia. It means that 
the State with lowest resource capacity is more than 2 times lower than the highest. 
The amount of tax on mining production reveals the main gap between States not 
only for the state endowment of natural resource but also on the production and 
exploitation cost. For example, the annual average spending related to mining such 
as road, service to industry, business development, regulation, protection of the 
environment and capital expense are included in the calculation. In general, 
Western Australia has a much strong mining production royalties amounting to 
AUD$ 2 180 per capita (CGC, 2015, p.5). This resource may vary largely 
depending on the international price and the demand of each material. Recently, 
Western Australia claimed for a modification to revenue assessment concerning the 
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volatility of price as this State is crashed by the downturn of material price. 
Nevertheless, Western Australia also has a strong capacity to raise other taxes 
equally.   
 
Expense need assessment: In 2015, the CGC include 13 categories of disability 
factor into the calculation, (CGC, 2015, p.5). The socio-demographic is the main 
source of a higher cost by which the first three sub-factors «remoteness», «regional 
cost» and «indigenous status» containing the largest amount of expenses, especially 
in Northern Territory because this State has a low level of population and 20 percent 
of indigenous population. That is why it has a GTS revenue requirement at AUD$ 
10 978 per capita which is 15.2 times higher than that of Western Australia. 
Although Western Australia has strong revenue capacity, the expenditure 
requirement of this State is also higher than national average because of its 
disability factor of wages cost and population growth. 
 
Table 2.2 Relativities, shares and GST distribution 2014-15 and 2015-16  
States and Territories 
Relativities Shares GST distribution 
2014-15 2015-16 2014-15 2015-16 2014-15 2015-16 
New South Wales  
Victoria 
Queensland 
Western Australia 
South Australia 
Tasmania 
Australian Capital Territory 
Northern Territory 
0.975 
0.883 
1.079 
0.376 
1.288 
1.635 
1.236 
5.661 
0.947 
0.893 
1.128 
0.300 
1.359 
1.819 
1.100 
5.571 
31.2 
20.0 
21.8 
4.2 
9.2 
3.6 
2.0 
5.9 
30.3 
22.3 
22.8 
3.4 
9.7 
3.9 
1.8 
5.9 
16’774 
11’828 
11’704 
2’248 
4’955 
1’914 
1’097 
3’189 
17’311 
12’755 
13’046 
1’935 
5’525 
2’236 
1’040 
3’351 
Total 1.000 1.000 100.0 100.0 53’710 57’200 
Source: Commonwealth Grant Commission (2015). 
 
The table 2.2 column (2) and (3) presents the relativities which are used to 
determine the GST distribution in 2014-15 and 2015-16. The amount allocated to 
each State reflects the difference of their fiscal capacity which is explained through 
the relativity per capita. The State whose relativity is higher than the national 
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average would be eligible to receive proportionally more transfer from the GST and 
verse vice for the State with lower relativity. Northern Territory has the highest 
relativity which is around 26 times higher than that of Western Australia. As a 
result, the former is eligible to receive 5.9 percent, meanwhile the later receives 4.2 
percent from the sharing of GST revenue. The three States receiving the largest 
amounts are New South Wales at 31.2 percent, Victoria at 22 percent and 
Queensland at 21.8 percent from the sharing of GST revenue. In term of transfer 
per capita, Northern Territory receive the highest share of GST, because this State 
have a low level of population in comparing to other States. 
 
Around AUD$ 57 billion are allocated through the horizontal fiscal mechanism 
which accounts for 50 percent of total intergovernmental transfer from 
Commonwealth to States, 30-70 percent of state budgets is discharged by the 
transfer.  
 
2.5 The performance of Australian equalization  
 
One way to view the performance of Australian fiscal equalization is that that to 
calculate the net transfer per capita after the equalization taking effect. In the table 
2.3, the first column presents the shares of state entitlement in respect to their 
relativities, the second column present the shares to each State on the equal per 
capita base. The difference between two amounts reveal whether one State is net 
contributor or beneficiary of the equalization. For 2014, around AUS$ 5.6 billion 
of GST entitlement is redistributed among States, the three net contributive States 
are New South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia contributing respectively 
around AUD$ 48, AUD$ 257 and AUD$ 1 407 per capita. Whereas, there are five 
net beneficiary States in which Northern Territory receives around AUD$ 10 495 
per capita, Tasmania receives AUD$ 1 551 and South Australia receives AUD$ 
633.  
 
There is a persistent disparity in term of fiscal capacity between Australian States 
on both the revenue raising capacity and expense needs. The objective of 
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equalization system is to focus on reducing the fiscal gaps between States after the 
equalization taking effect. In measuring the effect of fiscal equalization, Hansjörg 
Blöchliger (2014, p. 8) has used the Gini coefficient of tax-raising capacity before 
and after equalization. According to his result, the Gini coefficient before 
equalization is 0.05 (2005) and 0.07 (2012) are reduced to zero after the 
equalization. It means that revenue raising disparity is virtually eliminated. Put 
differently, the capacity of providing public goods and service is equally distributed 
across Australian States due to the effect of equalization transfer. 
 
Table 2.3 Net GST distribution per capita-2015 
 GST distribution 
 2014-15  budget 
 $million 
Equal per capital 
 distribution of 
 GST $million 
 
Redistribution  
$million 
Projected 
 population 
‘000 
Per capita 
 Redistribution 
 $ 
NSW 
VIC 
QLD 
WA 
SA 
TAS 
ACT 
NT 
16’758.1 
11’828.4 
11’735.7 
2’255.3 
4’956.3 
1’911.4 
1’098.6 
3’166.4 
17’119.5 
13’345.2 
10’835.6 
5’970.0 
3’832.7 
1’164.5 
885.3 
557.1 
-351.5 
-1’516.8 
900.0 
-3’714.7 
1’123.6 
746.9 
213.3 
2’609.0 
7’567 
5’899 
4’789 
2’639 
1’694 
515 
391 
246 
-47.8 
-257.2 
187.9 
-1’407.8 
663.3 
1’451.1 
545.1 
10’595.4 
Total 53’710.0 557.0 5’593.0  23’740 
Source: Minister for Finance of the Commonwealth of Australia (2014). 
 
The ratio of highest to lowest tax-raising capacity is equal to 1 after the equalization 
for 2005 and 2012, while these ratios are 4.8 (2005) and 7.5 (2012) before the 
equalization. The proportion of GST redistributed to five States which are below 
that national average has increased considerably from 2000 to 2015. The four less 
populous States having 12 percent of Australia’s population receive about 21 
percent of the GST, meanwhile the distributed amount to State with strong fiscal 
capacities has decreased over time (CGC, 2015, p.123). The annual amounts of 
transfer reflect the variations of relativity between States from year to year. In spite 
of a full equalization system, the evolution of relativities is increasingly diverse 
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according to mainly the revenue raising capacity and expense needs. As a 
consequence, a larger disparity of fiscal capacity requires for increasing amount of 
the equalization. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
The complexity of the formulas does not ensure its efficiency over the simple 
formulas, furthermore this characteristic make the calculation difficult to 
understand by the voters as the main contributor to tax revenues. So that, applying 
some simple formulas may be a better response. Recently, the CGC is on the way 
to change certain elements in their formulas in order to make the calculation process 
more transparent and accountability. 
 
The process of budget assessment is highly complex, imprecise and subjective, 
particularly on the expense need assessment which is based on judgments rather 
than econometric estimation, likewise, the revenue assessment uses the national 
average rather than a predetermined benchmarking. Anwar Shah (2006, p. 29) 
argued on the trade-off between efficiency and horizontal equity in the Australian 
equalization that «If a rich State decides to send a man to the mars or pave its roads 
with gold or buy limousines for its officials. Why should equalization payments go 
up».  Thus, he concludes that it is more desirable that the equalization should focus 
on a few merit goods.  
 
The CGC is established in order to make the calculation of equalization transfer. 
This institution is, however, expensive with an annual budget of AUD$ 6.5 million 
and 42 staff, the annual rapport of CGC consist of more than 2000 pages presenting 
how the process work, qualifying factors, judgment (Stephen Kirchner, 2013, p.29). 
A huge resource is allocated to this commission, meanwhile it does not make sure 
that it is more efficient than other system where a temporary group of experts is 
engaged just for a period to make the calculation.   
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Chapter 3 Fiscal equalization in 
Germany 
 
3.1 Institutional arrangement of the German Federal Republic 
 
After the French Revolution and the end of Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815) The 
German Confederation (Deutscher Bund)) is established as a lose association of 39 
States for the objective of coordinating their economies. However, this 
confederation collapsed under obstacle of nationalist trend, the 1948 revolution and 
the rivalry between Prussia and Austria. As consequence, another association was 
formed in 1866 known as North German Confederation with 22 independent States 
under leadership of Prussia. It was the first modern German nation State which was 
the base for the German Empire (1871-1918). 
 
Although the Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck has established the system of 
social security since 1881, there was no clear fact about the intergovernmental fiscal 
transfer in Germany for the first half of 20th century. Under the regime Nazi, the 
Germany became a strongly centralized state and the parliaments of German 
Landers were replaced by Nazi governors. At the end of the Second World War, 
Germany was divided into two countries with separated political regime. However, 
the modern public finance including the fiscal equalization was built in West 
Germany with 11 Landers and a population of 63 million in 1990. After the 
unification, new five States of East Germany were integrated to the Federal 
Republic of Germany, then the fiscal equalization now covered over 16 Landers.  
 
Modern Germany is a federation with 16 constituent States known also as Landers. 
German territory covers a large surface of 357.000 square kilometers with a 
population of more than 80 million and a density of 226 people per square 
kilometer. The federal parliament consists of two houses, namely the Bundestag 
and the Bundestag. Members of the Bundestag are directly elected every four years 
and represent the people, while members of the Bundesrat represent the Landers. 
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The federal state is under leadership of the president, while the Federal Chancellor 
heads the government and is also the leader of the executive power. Each Lander 
has a parliament with only one chamber. Half of members of Bundestag are elected 
directly from constituencies under the system so-called «First past the post system». 
Another half is elected from the list of landers political parties in such a way as to 
achieve proportional representation. According to the Article 51 of the Basic Law, 
the Bundesrat shall consist of members of lander governments: Ministers, 
permanent secretaries and heads of government. The Bundesrat plays a key role in 
the highly interlocked relations between the two houses of the government in 
Germany. 
 
Legislative initiative is vested in the federal government and the two houses of 
parliament. For a change to the Basic Law (known also as the German 
Constitution), it needs to be approved by the Bundesrat. Any law that affect the 
Lander’s interest also requires an approval from the Bundesrat. There are certain 
specific legislative matters requiring an approval of Bundestag are identified in the 
Basic Law. For other legislations, the Bundesrat can make a veto over bills by a 
majority voting. However, this majority voting can be valid only by an equal 
majority, for example: If the veto rate is at two-thirds of Bundesrat’s votes, the 
Bundestag need to get at least two-thirds vote to override the veto. 
 
The Bundestag has the right to be informed of the affaires of the federation from 
the government and the Bundestag through ministries and other bodies. The 
Bundesrat also has the right of review over foreign affairs and affairs of the 
European Union since its approval is required to pass resolutions relating to these 
fields. 
 
3.2 Assignment of public functions in Germany 
 
3.2.1 Assignment of competences 
 
55 
 
 
 
German federalism is a type of executive federalism with a centralized legislation 
and a decentralized execution and administration at Landers and Municipalities. 
According to the 1949 Basic Law, the federal government has an explicit list of 
exclusive public domains and of domains shared with the Landers. The Basic Law 
also designates the federal power to provide framework legislation in some fields 
and give considerable importance to decentralized administration of federal laws. 
As following, the federal government has a large legislative authority, while the 
landers and Municipalities are generally responsible for the implementation and 
administration policies. In accordance with this principle of responsibility sharing, 
Landers administer and execute around 75 percent of federal laws, including the 
federal laws on the collection of main taxes such as TVA, corporate and personal 
income tax. 
 
The Basic Law assigns the federal government exclusive power over: Foreign 
affairs, national defense, citizenship, immigration, currency printing (already 
assigned to the European Central Bank), the air transport, postal system and 
telecommunication. In addition, the federal government has also the priority over 
twenty fields including civil law, criminal law and highways. The Landers have 
their power over culture, healthcare, education, public order, environmental 
protection and regional development policy. Municipalities, as a part of Landers, 
are protected by Article 28 of the Basic Law which grants them self-administration 
and financial autonomy on various local public goods and services such as local 
healthcare facilities, school building, public housing and local roads and other local 
services (Laufer, (1994), cited in Roden, 2003, p. 8 ). 
 
The amendment of German Basic Law in 1969 has thoroughly reformed the 
German fiscal federalism. This constitutional change mainly concerned «joint 
tasks» between the federal government and Landers and it was an important step 
which turns Germany from «dual federalism» to «cooperative federalism». As a 
result, Landers have accepted to give up certain exclusive fields in exchange for a 
complex form of multi-level cooperation in policy formation and financing. These 
fields are stipulated in the Article 91a of the Basic Law, including university 
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constructions, regional industrial policy and agricultural policy. Other fields are 
also shifted to shared status such as housing, urban renewal, urban transportation 
and hospitals (Article 104a), secondary education and research financing (Article 
91b). The financial impact of the reform led to a higher level of intergovernmental 
interconnection of co-financing activities, then the federal expenditure devoted to 
joint tasks increases by 15 percent (OECD, 1998, cited in Roden, 2003, p. 8). 
 
3.2.2 Taxing power 
 
Under present tax assignment, each level of government has its own exclusive and 
shared access to taxes as the table 3.1 shows.  
 
Table 3.1 Assignment of taxing competence 
Federation 
Excise taxes, tax on insurances, motor vehicle, air traffic, 
nuclear plants, and solidarity surcharge tax.  
Landers 
Inheritances tax, land acquisition tax, tax on lotteries, fire 
protection tax, and beer tax.  
Municipalities 
Property taxes (A: agricultural and B: all others), trade tax 
(minus apportionment and, (minor) local consumption taxes  
Shared taxes 
Personal income tax, corporate tax, VAT/Turnover tax and 
capital gain tax 
Source: Färber (2013). 
 
The Basic Law provides explicitly three lists of taxes which are attributed to three 
levels of government: Federal, Landers and Municipalities. It also sets out clear 
rules for sharing of personal income tax (PIT), corporate tax, capital gain tax and 
VAT three levels according to following rules 
 
 In 2012, an amount  of 15 percent of the personal income tax (according to 
the place of residence) is allocated to Municipalities, while the federal 
government and Landers share the rest with 42.5 percent for each level 
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 Federal government and Landers share the corporate income tax equally 
(according to the location of the head operation or distribution office of the 
corporation) 
 For the capital gains tax, a total of € 8.2 billion is shared to 3 levels : 44 
percent to federation, 44 percent to Landers and 12 percent to Municipalities 
 Revenue from the VAT/turnover tax is also shared between the federal 
government and the Landers, However, a federal law must be drafted and 
require an approval from the Bundesrat to determine the rules of sharing. 
These rules are revised over time and may be modified under the bargaining 
between two levels of government. In 1970-1971, the VAT distribution was 
70 percent for the Bund and 30 percent for Landers. From 1972-1990, the 
distribution of VAT remained stable where it varied from 65 to 69 percent 
and 34 to 37 percent. From 1998-1999 the distribution is about 50.5 percent 
and 49.5 percent. In recent years, the VAT distribution is around 50 percent 
for each one. In 2012, about € 195 billion of VAT revenue is share to three 
level where 2.2 percent to Municipalities, the remainder is shared at 50.32 
percent to Landers and 49.68 percent to the federal government (Lenk, 1999 
and Finanzbericht, 1999, cited in Guihéry, 2001).  
 
The details of revenue sharing is figured out in the table 3.2: 
 
Table 3.2 Tax sharing three layers of government 
Tax revenues in 2012 
Billion € Tax Bund Lander Municipalities 
206.4 Personal income tax 42.5% 42.5% 15% 
16.9 Corporate income tax 50% 50%  
8.2 Capital gains tax 44% 44% 12% 
194.6 Turnover tax 
3.68+5.15% 
49.68 
 
50.32% 
2.2% 
Source: Färber (2013). 
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These shared taxes are collected by Landers on behalf of the Bund. As following, 
the shared amounts will be returned to the Landers according to the rules of sharing. 
Another remark is that, there are two taxes which are collected and remitted to the 
federal government: One is the custom duty which is later forwarded to the 
European Union, one another is duty on beer which will be paid in full to the 
Landers. 
 
Other taxes such as excise taxes are set and collected by the federal government, 
meanwhile Landers have exclusive power to set and collect taxes on gambling and 
gaming, real estate taxes, taxes on real estate transaction and taxes on motor 
vehicles. Municipalities are allowed to access to property tax, trade tax and dog tax 
where revenue from property tax is most important resource. Prior to 1998, this tax 
had two components, one of them has now been abolished, namely the former local 
tax on ownership of corporations and has been replaced by the share of VAT 
revenue from the Bund.  
 
3.2.3 Spending power 
 
Previously, the Bundesrat had considerable influence the laws in various domains. 
After the 2006 reform, its influence is restrained to certain domains. However, the 
Bundesrat still has an influence on the laws that affect their interest with regard to 
lander finances. In this sense, a federal bill related to the taxing and spending to 
Landers require a consent of Bundesrat for approval.4  
 
In the case of spending power, there is a high degree of overlapping functional 
distribution over three levels of government. As a consequence, there is not reliable 
indicator to classify the actual spending amount of each level. However, the general 
public expenditure of three levels (without social insurance) account for € 870 
billion. The graphic 3.1 shows that the federal government contributes to 38.5 
percent of the total expenditure, Landers and Municipalities to 37.7 and 23.8 
percent respectively. Besides, € 534 billion is allocated to social insurance and € 30 
                                                          
4 See the Article 104a, Subsection 3 and Article 105, Subsection 4 of the Basic Law. 
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billion to European Union. In total, the German expenditure budget amounted to € 
1 208 million. 
 
Graphic 3.1 Breakdown of public expenditure in Germany 
Source: Source: Calculated by author from www.destatis.de. 
 
3.3 Former fiscal equalization in West Germany 
 
The Article 107 of the Basic Law provides grounds of horizontal fiscal equalization 
mechanism between Landers. This constitutional arrangement includes a horizontal 
transfer mechanism as well as tax sharing rule for the objective of fiscal 
equalization. Other directive laws regulating these arrangements were also passed 
at the Federal Republic of West Germany in 1969 and 1977. The Basic Law of West 
Germany provides as following: 
 
«A federal law requiring the consent of the Bundesrat shall ensure a reasonable 
financial equalization between financially strong Landers and financially weak 
Landers, due account being taken of financial capacity and requirements of 
communes»  
Article 107(2), the 1969 West German Basic Law. 
 
There were two fiscal equalization programs in West Germany: One was horizontal 
equalization which was used to make the financial transfer from financially strong 
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Landers to financial weak Landers respecting to the difference between tax 
potential indicator and the «expenditure need indicator». Another one was vertical 
transfer by which the federal government used to distribute additionally the value-
added tax (VAT or turnover tax) to the financially weak Landers.  
 
3.3.1 Fiscal equalization between West German Landers 
 
3.3.1.1 Calculation of tax potential indicator 
The tax potential indicator of each Lander is the sum of the lander tax potential and 
plus 50 percent of tax potential of its local jurisdictions. Two components are 
calculated separately by bother level of government before taking together, 
however, only lander budgets is taken into account as the reference base for 
equalization.  
 
First, the Lander’s share of personal income tax, the business tax and real estate tax 
are summed up, then subtract the result to special burdens. The business tax and the 
real estate tax on agriculture are calculated by applying a standardized rate to the 
actual tax base, while the real estate tax on non-agricultural property is treated 
differently. Second, 50 percent of the Municipalities’ tax potential is added to the 
Lander’s tax potential. The process of calculation would be easier if the payroll tax 
was not levied by some Municipalities. This will lead to an error of calculation as 
the Municipality where payroll taxes are levied would be better off in equalization 
transfer if they abolish this tax. 
 
3.3.1.2 Calculation of expenditure needs indicator 
In West Germany, the calculation of expenditure needs is based on the average 
nationwide tax revenue per capita. This seems to be reasonable because the tax 
revenue of all Landers and Municipalities sustain their actual expenditures. Put in 
other words, because the amount of taxing is equal to that of spending on an average 
per capita basic, even though the actual tax revenue per capita varies considerably 
from one Lander to another.  
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In the process of calculating expenditure needs, there are many types of burdens are 
taken into consideration. However, there are only two important modifications (see 
table 3.3 and 3.4) of average per capita figure are used at the Lander level. The 
expenditure needs figures are calculated separately for the Landers and the 
Municipalities as far as they are included. 
 
Table 3.3 Adjustment for local population size 
Population size Weight (percent) 
First 5 000 inhabitant 100 
Next 15 000 inhabitants 110 
Next 80 000 inhabitants 125 
Next 400 000 inhabitants 120 
Next 500 000 inhabitants 120 
Next inhabitants 230 
Source: Advisory Commission on Inter-governmental Relations (1981). 
 
Table 3.4 Adjustment for population density (This procedure is applied to 
large Municipalities where their populations are 500.000 inhabitants) 
Density 
Adjustment (increasing of population in 
percent) 
1 500-2 000 inhabitants/km2 2 percent 
2 000-3 000 inhabitants/km2 4 percent 
>3000 inhabitants/km2 6 percent 
Source: Advisory Commission on Inter-governmental Relations (1981). 
 
The difference between the tax potential indicator and the expenditure need 
indicator presents the financial position of each Lander which is confirmed by 
«deficit» or «surplus» Lander. The group of surplus Landers (financially strong 
Landers) will finance the group of deficit Landers in such a way that allows the 
later to raise their revenue potentials up to 92 percent of the national average. In 
62 
 
 
 
1976, there were six financially strong Landers which financed five financially 
weak Landers with a total amount of DMs 448 million (Advisory Commission on 
intergovernmental relation, 1981, p. 40). 
 
This horizontal equalization leads to a large movement of budget between Landers, 
this would lead to political difficulties and disputes because each Lander tries to 
add more reason to renegotiate its position. Put differently, the Landers so-called 
«losers» of this mechanism would argue to pay less to the equalization fund, while 
the «winners» react in such a way to get more for giving more «special burdens» in 
their budgets. 
 
3.3.2 Distribution of VAT/Turnover tax 
 
Another mechanism of fiscal equalization is the distribution of the value add tax 
(VAT) between Landers in West Germany. The Article 107 of the Basic Law 
provided that 75 percent of VAT is distributed to all Landers according to their 
population shares, another 25 percent is allocated to Landers in an equalizing way. 
This kind of equalization procedure uses two following steps 
 
 Those Landers whose tax revenues from its own resource, (without net VAT 
share) lies below the national average, will receive sufficient receipts from 
the net VAT in such a way that brings them up to 92 percent of the national 
average. 
 The remaining part of the 25 percent fund is distributed to Landers with 
weak tax potential. If tax revenues of any one of these Landers  (including 
net VAT share) are still under average of all states, this difference should be 
equalized by taking sufficient amount from other Landers of the same 
group. 
 
Beyond the two mechanisms as being discussed on previous section, the Basic Law 
also provide background for the federal government. The Federal government may 
give additional amounts which are agreed upon a process of negotiation between 
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the federal government and the particular Landers for the objective of adjusting the 
VAT share. In 1976, there were five Landers:  Bavaria, Schleswig-Holstein, 
Rhineland- Palatinate, Lower Saxony and Saarland which have accessed to such 
payment (Advisory Commission on intergovernmental relation, 1981, p. 40). 
 
3.4 The present system of fiscal equalization  
 
3.4.1 New conditions and three stages of fiscal equalization in Germany 
 
Over the two last decades of 20th century, intergovernmental fiscal relation has 
largely changed under certain new conditions: German unification and European 
integration that influence on the institutional rearrangement in Germany. The 
German unification has integrated five East German Landers with an area 108.000 
square kilometers and a population of 16 million. On the other hand, there are some 
new types of jurisdictions such as cities, towns, local associations. The European 
integration process lead to form new supranational institutions that require the 
public resource in order to meet common issues. In addition, European membership 
requires the public debt and deficit criteria to be respected. 
 
Consequently, the fiscal equalization should be reformed in order to adapt to new 
requirements. The modification of the Basic Law has encouraged not only the 
equalization among Landers but also the creating of local cooperation and 
associations. There are increasingly landers which implement equalization 
mechanism for Municipalities within their boundaries and components of formula- 
based equalization is largely different from one Lander to another. Article 107 is 
now modified as following: 
 
«Such law shall ensure a reasonable equalization of the disparate financial 
capacities of the Lander, with due regard for the financial capacities and needs of 
Municipalities (associations of Municipalities). It shall specify the conditions 
governing the claims of Lander entitled to equalization payments and the liabilities 
of Lander required to make them as well as the criteria for determining the amounts 
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of such payments. It may also provide for grants to be made by the Federation to 
financially weak Lander from its own funds to assist them in meeting their general 
financial needs (supplementary grants) ». 
Article 107, the 2006 German Basic Law. 
 
Following to the tax revenue’s sharing as being discussed in the section 3.2.2, the 
fiscal equalization with formula-based fiscal equalization mechanism is in 
operation. The German fiscal equalization consist of three-stage process as 
following: 
 
At the first stage, the Landers’ share of total national VAT revenues will be 
reallocated among them: 75 percent of VAT revenue share is distributed among 
them on a per capita basic. The remaining 25 percent is transferred to Landers with 
initial tax revenue per capita lower than the national average. It should be remarked 
that the tax revenues taken into calculation including all pure Lander’s taxes, 
Lander’s share of personal income tax and corporate income tax.  
 
At the second stage, the horizontal fiscal equalization is applied where the financial 
strength index and equalization index5 are calculated for each lander. The special 
burden is now excluded from the tax potential after the reform in 2001. The 
financial strength index is the sum of Lander tax revenues from personal income 
tax, corporate tax, royalties, VAT (including the amount of VAT transfer of first 
stage) and other Lander taxes plus 64 percent of Municipalities taxes collected on 
a Lander’s boundary. The same formula is used to the equalization index, the 
difference is that the population coefficients will be assigned to both component of 
the formula. Taking together the financial strength index and the equalization index 
to determine where a Lander is the contributor or beneficiary of horizontal transfer. 
Landers with low financial strength index will receive payment in such a way that 
allows them to reach to at least 97 percent of federal average per-capita tax 
revenues.  
 
                                                          
5 Buettner T. (2006, p.220) use two term «Fiscal capacity» and «Fiscal needs» in place. 
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Finally, the federal government provides supplementary grants to the Landers with 
low financial strength index in order to reduce further the difference of financial 
strength per capita. In general, these transfers are allocated through two types: One 
is general supplementary grant and another is federal special grant which are used 
to fund for special needs and the financially weak Landers. Before the German 
unification, the fund for this kind of transfer was capped at 2 percent of total VAT 
revenue. After the unification and especially after the 1995 reform, the cap has been 
released. This payment plays an important role in increasing the fiscal resource for 
the five new Landers (Pitlik and Schmid, 2000). Furthermore, the supplementary 
grant targeting not only five East German Landers but also small Landers such as 
Bremen and Saarland which face to the difficulties in shifting from the old to new 
equalization mechanism.  
 
3.4.2 Formulas of fiscal equalization 
 
3.4.2.1 Additional share of VAT/Turnover tax (Ergänzungsanteile) 
The remaining 25 percent of VAT is allocated to the Landers whose resources from 
income tax, corporate tax and other Lander’s taxes per capita are below the national 
average. The amount which is distributed to beneficiary Landers is called additional 
share (Ergänzungsanteile). Beneficiary Landers will be classified to two subgroups 
according to whether their revenues is lower than 97 percent or lie between 97 
percent and 100 percent of the national average. Consequently, the allocation 
formula is modified with respect to the group to which the beneficiary Lander 
belongs. The transfer of additional share of VAT is vertically and directly made 
from the federal government to beneficiary Landers. 
 
The result of additional share of VAT is showed in the table 3.5. The column (3) 
presents the revenue index per inhabitant. In 2013, an amount of € 80 billion are 
allocated to Landers in which € 10 billion is used for additional share to eleven 
Landers while € 70 billion are shared between Landers according to lander 
population shares. 
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Under the present rule, the total amount of additional VAT share should not exceed 
25 percent of VAT share to Landers, if it is the case, the excessive amount will be 
proportionally reduced according to each beneficiary Lander. The column (6) 
shows that, the allocated amount is about 12 percent of VAT share.  
 
Table 3.5 Additional share of VAT 
Land 
 
 
Additional share of VAT                                                                         Distribution proportional to 
                                                                                                                 population Total 
allocated 
amounts  
(*1000 
euro) Revenues 
(*1000 
euro) 
Revenues 
per 
inhabitant 
(euro) 
Revenues 
index per 
inhabitant 
(Average 
=100) 
Entitlemen
t to the 
additional 
share of 
VAT(Yes 
or No) 
allocated 
amounts 
(*1000 
euro) Population 
allocated 
amounts 
(*1000 
euro) 
NW 
BY 
BW 
NI 
HE 
SN 
RP 
ST 
SL 
TH 
BB 
MV 
SL 
BE 
HH 
HB 
23’488’028 
21’197’350 
16’495’969 
8’898’695 
10’114’447 
2’737’375 
5’111’201 
1’483’533 
3’461’707 
1’427’639 
2’030’142 
1’056’519 
1’063’211 
3’976’339 
3’667’583 
821’046 
1’315.81 
1’693.20 
1’534.52 
1’121.83 
1’667.98 
6’59.03 
1’275.57 
632.72 
1’222.63 
637.01 
809.58 
641.66 
1’042.55 
1’154.44 
2’061.44 
1’244.84 
100.50 
129.33 
117.21 
85.69 
127.40 
50.34 
97.43 
48.33 
93.39 
48.66 
61.84 
49.01 
79.63 
88.18 
157.45 
95.08 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
0 
0 
0 
1’357’667 
0 
2’537’114 
101’167 
1’490’773 
213’488 
1’415’827 
1’173’078 
1’032’909 
251’357 
482’851 
0 
35’816 
17’850’560 
12’519'130 
10’749’924 
7’932’282 
6’063’885 
4’153’631 
4’006’995 
2’344’679 
2’831’364 
2’241’157 
2’507’654 
1’646’539 
1’019’815 
3’444’400 
1’779’140 
659’561 
15’393’014 
10’795’580 
9’269’946 
6’840’219 
5’229’050 
3’581’787 
3’455’339 
2’021’879 
2’441’561 
1’932’610 
2’162’417 
1’419’855 
879’414 
2’970’198 
1’534’200 
568’757 
15’393’014 
10’795’580 
9’269’946 
8’197’886 
5’229’050 
6’118’901 
3’556’506 
3’512’652 
2’655’049 
3’348’437 
3’335’495 
2’452’764 
1’130’771 
3’453’049 
1’534’200 
604’573 
Total 
Ave. 
107’030’784 
 
 
1 309.23 
 
100.0 
 10’092’047 81’750’716 70’495’826 80’587’873 
Source: Vandernoot (2014). 
 
3.4.2.2 Horizontal equalization among Landers (Finanzausgleich) 
For this equalization program, the financially strong Landers will finance the 
financially weak Landers. In this sense, the fund is contributed by «rich Landers» 
and allocated directly to the budgets of «poor Landers» without intervention of the 
federation. To determine one Lander is contributor to or beneficiary from the fund, 
the financial strength index (FSI) and the equalization index (IE) will be separately 
calculated. The fraction of two indexes multiplied to 100 to determine one Lander 
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is the contributor or beneficiary. The formulas employed to calculate the FSI and 
EI are presented in the box 3.1. 
 
Box 3.1 Formulas for calculating the financial strength index (FSI) and 
equalization index (EI) 
          FSIL =RL + (0.64×RM)       (3.1) 
Where: 
FSIL  Financial strength index of the Lander in question; 
RL  Revenues of the Lander from: Income tax, corporate tax, lander taxes, 
VAT tax and royalties; 
RM Revenues of the Municipalities in the Lander in question; 
 
Where 
EIL  Equalization index of the Lander in question; 
RT Total revenues of the Lander from: Income tax, the corporate tax, the 
lander taxes, the VAT and royalties;     
PL Population of the Lander in question; 
CL1 Population coefficient assigned to the Lander in question for the first part 
of the formula; 
WPT1 Total German population weighted to reflect the population coefficients 
assigned to the Lander for the first part of the formula (83.809.801 
inhabitants in 2010); 
RMT Total Municipalities revenues for all Landers; 
CL2 Population coefficient assigned to the Lander in question for the second 
part of the formula; 
WPT2 Total German population weighted to reflect the population coefficients 
assigned to the Lander for the second part of the formula (84.014.251 in 
2010). 
Source: Vandernoot (2014). 
 
(3.2) 
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The beneficiary Landers are divided into three groups according to the fraction 
between two indexes. The Lander of each group will be assigned some coefficients 
to determine the amount that it will receive from the fund. The same process is 
applied to determine the amount that each contributor Lander will pay to the fund. 
The table 3.6 shows the classification rules.  
 
Table 3.6 Classification of Landers according to the fraction between 
financial strong index and equalization index 
 Beneficiary Landers Contributor Landers 
𝐹𝑆𝐼
𝐸𝐼
 ×100 
< 80 ≥ 100 but <107 
≥ 80  but  < 93 ≥ 107 but < 120 
≥ 93 but < 100 ≥ 120 
Source: Adapted by author from Vandernoot (2014). 
 
The result of horizontal equalization between German Landers is showed in the 
table 3.7. The financial strength index is resulted from applying the formula (4.1) 
while the equalization index is from the formula (4.2). The column (8) shows the 
fraction between the financial strength index and the equalization index of landers. 
This index gives a signal to classify Landers into two groups of beneficiaries and 
contributors. There are twelve Landers which belong the group one and four to the 
group two. In referring to the formula section, we can determine the amount of 
receipt or payment for each Lander as figured out in the last column. The result «0» 
means that the total amount received is equal to the amount paid. 
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Table 3.7 Horizontal fiscal equalization  
Land 
Financial strength index (FSI 
(thousand euro) (municipal indexes are 
multiplied by 0.64) 
Equalization index (EI) (thousand euro) 
(municipal indexes are multiplied by 
 0.64) FSI/EI
*100 
Land: 
contributor 
or  
beneficiary 
 
Amount 
 Received 
 (+) or (-) 
(thousand 
 euro) 
 
 
Municipali
ties Lander Total 
Municipal
ities Lander Total 
NW 
BY 
BW 
NI 
HE 
SN 
RP 
ST 
SL 
TH 
BB 
MV 
SL 
BE 
HH 
HB 
10’256’897 
31’993’370 
25’722’512 
17’601’267 
15’344’125 
8’835’344 
8’671’563 
4’991’343 
6’198’675 
4’774’149 
5’366’385 
3’506’440 
2’193’982 
7’362’764 
5’200’044 
1’425’619 
38’881’529 
31’993’370 
25’722’512 
17’601’267 
15’344’125 
8’835’344 
8’671’563 
4’991’343 
6’198’675 
4’774’149 
5’366’385 
3’506’440 
2’193’982 
7’362’764 
5’200’044 
1’425’619 
49’147’426 
40’449’705 
32’904’396 
21’641’547 
19’663’702 
10’248’554 
10’693’685 
5’789’779 
7’708’392 
5’513’776 
6’388’595 
4’023’263 
2’687’597 
8’858’337 
6’854’642 
1’843’656 
9’847’576 
6’906’399 
5’930’385 
4’375’983 
3’345’249 
2’291’424 
2’210’529 
1’319’353 
1’561’972 
1’236’374 
1’424’893 
953’759 
562’599 
2’565’221 
1’325’017 
491’209 
40’056’639 
28’092’915 
24’122’819 
17’800’033 
13’607’352 
9’320’744 
8’991’693 
5’261’457 
6’353’578 
5’029’154 
5’627’173 
3’694’832 
2’288’464 
10’434’461 
5’389’724 
1’998’073 
49’904’215 
34’999’314 
30’053’204 
22’176’016 
16’952’601 
11’612’168 
11’202’222 
6’580’810 
7’915’550 
6’265’528 
7’052’066 
4’648’591 
2’851’063 
12’999’682 
6’714’741 
2’489’282 
98.48 
115.57 
109.49 
97.59 
115.99 
88.26 
95.46 
87.98 
97.38 
88.00 
90.59 
86.55 
94.27 
68.14 
102.08 
74.06 
beneficiary 
contributor 
contributor 
beneficiary 
contributor 
beneficiary 
beneficiary 
beneficiary 
beneficiary 
beneficiary 
beneficiary 
beneficiary 
beneficiary 
beneficiary 
contributor 
beneficiary 
354’301 
-3’511’134 
-1’708’837 
259’089 
-1’752’340 
853’882 
266’630 
497’026 
101’218 
472’220 
401’042 
399’149 
89’331 
2’899’964 
-66’307 
444’764 
Total 46’347’942 188’069’111 234’417’053 46’347’942 188’069’111 234’417’053   0 
Source: Vandernoot (2014). 
 
3.4.2.3 Federal supplementary Grants (Bundesergänzungszuweisungen) 
On the supplementary transfer which are vertically distributed from the Bund the 
Landers. A total amount of € 12 billion in are allocated through this mechanism in 
2010. This fund is divided into two allocation types.  
 
1. The Federal General Grant (FGG): Following the horizontal equalization, 
if the addition of the financial strength capacity and the amount received 
from horizontal equalization is lower than 95.5 percent the equalization 
index. The Lander in question will be compensated for 77.5 percent of the 
difference.  
 
The table 3.8 shows that there are twelve Landers which were qualified to receive 
this kind of transfer.  The Landers benefit from the transfer is also the beneficiaries 
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of the horizontal transfer, meanwhile the four Landers which are contributors of 
horizontal equalization mechanism are non-benefiting Landers of the federal 
general grant. The allocated amount is around € 2.6 billions in which 35 percent is 
granted to Berlin which has a lowest index at 90.4 percent. 
 
Table 3.8 Federal General Grant 
Land 
Financial strength 
capacity + 
equalization (FSI + E) 
(thousand euro) 
 
 
Equalization index (EI) 
(thousand euro) 
 
 
(FSI+E)/(E
I)*100 
 
 
Amount received  
(thousand euro) 
NW 
BY 
BW 
NI 
HE 
SN 
RP 
ST 
SL 
TH 
BB 
MV 
SL 
BE 
HH 
HB 
Total 
49’501’727 
36’938’571 
31’195’559 
21’900’636 
17’911’362 
11’102’436 
10’960’315 
6’286’805 
7’809’610 
5’985’996 
6’789’637 
4’422’412 
2’776’928 
11’758’301 
6’788’335 
2’288’420 
49’904’215 
34’999’314 
30’053’204 
22’176’016 
16’952’601 
11’612’168 
11’202’222 
6’580’810 
7’915’550 
6’265’528 
7’052’066 
4’648’591 
2’851’063 
12’999’682 
6’714’741 
2’489’282 
99.193 
105.541 
103.801 
98.758 
105.656 
95.610 
97.841 
95.532 
98.662 
95.539 
96.279 
95.134 
97.399 
90.451 
101.096 
91.931 
118’549 
0 
0 
127 487 
0 
350’045 
144’069 
202’353 
51’431 
192’358 
176’056 
157’275 
46’407 
911’697 
0 
146’022 
2’623’750 
Source: Vandernoot (2014). 
 
2. The Federal Special Grant (FSG): This kind of fund is engaged to 
compensate the special burden of Landers. Except the bailout category 
which was used to fund some Landers with excessive debt from 1994-2004, 
the grant is allocated to Landers according the three categories:  
 
 For cost of new Landers: In 2010, five new Landers and the City-state of Berlin 
shared an amount of € 8.7 billion for the cost of infrastructure and low financial 
strength of their Municipalities; 
 For cost of structural unemployment: € 1 billion is provided to five new Landers 
to cover the cost due to high level of unemployment and social charges; 
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 For cost of political leadership: An amount of € 516 million is allocated to ten 
small Landers in order to support their higher political and administrative cost. 
The result is outlined in the table 3.9. 
 
Table 3.9 Federal Special Grant 
Lander 
First grant 
(thousand euro) 
Second grant 
(thousand euro) 
third grant  
(thousand euro) 
NW 
BY 
BW 
NI 
HE 
SN 
RP 
ST 
SL 
TH 
BB 
MV 
SL 
BE 
HH 
HB 
Total 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2’279’803 
0 
1’375’569 
0 
1’250’910 
1’252’615 
921’205 
0 
1’662’989 
0 
0 
8’743’091 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
319’000 
0 
187’000 
0 
176’000 
190’000 
128’000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1’000’000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
25’565 
46’016 
52’663 
53’174 
55’731 
55’220 
61’355 
63’400 
43’460 
0 
60’332 
516’916 
Source: Adapted by author from Vandernoot (2014). 
 
From 2005, the federal supplementary grant is gradually reduced. It was amounted 
up to € 14 billion in 2008, reduced to € 12 billion in 2010, then € 11 billion in 2012. 
However, the general supplementary grant rose again to € 2.9 billion in 2012 after 
being decreased to € 2.6 billion in 2010. For the federal special grant, the first 
category is considerably reduced from € 10 billion to € 7 billion in 2012. This 
category is planned to end in 2019. Whereas, the second and the third category 
remain stable.  
 
3.5 Performance of German fiscal equalization 
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The German fiscal equalization has led to a robust redistributive effect among 
Landers as being showed in the table 3.10. In the first column, the initiative index 
varies widely because of the differences of fiscal resource based on the personal 
income tax, corporate tax, lander taxes and royalties. Before the equalization 
mechanism taking effect, the lowest index is 48.33 points (Saxony-Anhalt) and the 
highest is 157.45 point (Hamburg) with a difference of 109.12 points. After the 
funding, the difference has been reduced to 63.18 with the lowest index is 89.61 
(North Rhine-Westphalia) and the highest is 152.79 (Berlin). In term of monetary 
value, nine Landers have received between € 163 and € 1 938 per inhabitant, other 
seven Landers have contributed between € 36 and € 987 per inhabitant.  
 
If we consider the gain and loss of revenue index per inhabitant after the funding, 
three Landers with financially strongest capacity: Hamburg, Bavaria and Hesse 
have correspondingly lost 40.12, 36.86, 36.29 points of revenue index to the 
equalization mechanism, meanwhile the three Landers taking gains of the 
mechanism are: Mecklenburg-Vorpommern gains 78.79, Saxony-Anhalt gains 
78.41 and Thuringia gains 76.93 point per inhabitant. 
 
If we rank the financial position of Landers in according to their indexes before and 
after the funding, five Landers at the lowest positions before the funding have 
changed considerably: Saxony-Anhalt is up to 4th from 16th, Thuringia is up to 5th 
from 15th, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern is up to 3th from 14th.  Saxony is up to 6th 
from 13th and Brandenburg is up to 7th from 12th. After the finding, Berlin is move 
to the first place from 9th with a gain of 8 places. 
 
Another method to evaluate the performance of German equalization mechanism is 
to compare the Gini coefficient before and after equalization. The result showed a 
large effect of equalization where the Gini coefficient of Germany is reduced from 
0.06 to 0.02 for 2005 and also in 2012. In addition, the ratio of highest to lowest 
tax-raising capacity reduced from 1.7 to 1.2 in 2005 and from 1.7 to 1.1 in 2012. 
(Hansjörg Blöchliger, 2014, p.8). 
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Table 3.10 Revenue Indexes after each stage of equalization mechanism 
Lander 
Before 
equalization 
After VAT’s  
redistribution 
After 
horizontal 
equalization 
After federal 
supplementary 
grants 
 Solidarity 
per 
inhabitant (in 
euro) 
NW 
BY 
BW 
NI 
HE 
SN 
RP 
ST 
SL 
TH 
BB 
MV 
SL 
BE 
HH 
HB 
Total 
100.5 
129.33 
117.21 
85.65 
127.4 
50.34 
97.43 
48.33 
93.39 
48.66 
61.84 
49.01 
79.63 
88.18 
157.45 
95.08 
100 
94.59 
110.98 
104.09 
96.51 
109.89 
92.61 
93.98 
92.54 
95.08 
92.58 
92.94 
92.58 
93.43 
93.67 
126.98 
93.87 
100 
95.46 
98.8 
97.19 
97.93 
97.34 
101.54 
96.87 
101.75 
96.63 
101.73 
99.88 
103.11 
97.23 
130.24 
125.36 
123.15 
100 
89.61 
92.47 
90.96 
92.31 
91.11 
124.14 
92.6 
126.6 
91.94 
125.59 
120.62 
127.8 
95.38 
152.79 
117.33 
127.98 
100 
-268 
-907 
-646 
163 
-893 
1’816 
-119 
1’929 
-36 
1’893 
1’446 
1’938 
388 
1’590 
-987 
809 
0 
 Source: Adapted by author from Vandernoot (2014). 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
Under constitutional mandate known as «equality of living condition» which 
characterizes the actual fiscal equalization at a high degree both on the vertical and 
horizontal mechanism. However, the financially weak Landers have not reduced 
their expenditures when their budgets are in deficit. It is argued that the 
supplementary transfer meet political bargains rather than a pure distributive plan. 
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In principle, this transfer can be turned into VAT sharing at the pre-equalization 
stage (Selmer, 1994). In addition, because the discretionary nature of these new 
vertical grants that has reduced the transparency of German fiscal equalization 
(Guihéry, 2001). 
 
Constitutional structure provides a good deal on fixing of tax shares in the Basic 
Law. However,  little revenue autonomy and generous equalization system deliver 
less incentive to make prudent budgetary constraints as some Landers have been 
aligned for bailout from the federal government under the decision of the Federal 
Court. Moreover, most of decision concerning the fiscal equalization is the result 
of unanimous voting at the federal parliament and voters cannot check the power 
over fiscal decisions because of lacking information. 
 
With a high level of fiscal centralization, Landers are strongly dependent on 
equalization resource. Because there is no constraint on spending and borrowings. 
, certain Landers have misconducted their fiscal policies. Lacking of such 
mechanism, financially strong Landers are becoming source of frustration, they 
begin to undermine the solidarity, challenging the fiscal equalization at the Federal 
Court. 
 
Under political process, the Bund is forced to bailout the Lander Saarland and 
Brennen. Constitutional Court has transformed the equivalence of living condition 
to guarantee the profligate Landers. The Landers indiscipline on borrowing and 
spending place Germany in a situation of violating the public finance criteria 
indicated in the Maastricht Treaty. On discussion of the reform, more 
decentralization by a process of function assignment to Landers and shift to strict 
horizontal equalization go give more fiscal autonomy.  Fiscal constraint should be 
applied at all three level of government (Rodden, 2005, p. 27). 
 
There are certain Landers with an extreme small in comparison to other on basic of 
population size, tax capacities and geographic area. A higher level of fiscal 
decentralization and political decentralization would encourage more voluntary 
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association of subnational governments. This would improve the fiscal 
performance, increase the well-being of citizen, more transparency and strengthen 
the flexibility of Lander and local public finance policy.   
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Chapter 4 Fiscal equalization in 
Switzerland 
 
4.1 Institutional arrangement of the Swiss Confederation 
 
4.1.1 Federal structure and institution 
 
The Swiss Confederation is a small country with a quite heterogeneous population. 
There are four official languages, a large diversity of culture and three levels of 
government: Confederation, 26 Cantons and about 2 760 Municipalities. The 
Constitution assigned certain areas such as foreign policy, monetary policy, and 
national defense to the Confederation, while the Cantons have a large power on 
nearly most of other fields. The federal executive branch consist of  7 members 
which are not elected directly by the voters but by the federal parliament for 
mandate of 4 years, presidential position is elected by the federal parliament for one 
year and has no exclusive power.  
 
The federal legislative known as federal assembly consists of two chambers: The 
National Council with 200 members elected by proportional principle to population, 
and the Council of States with 46 members represent the Cantons. When the 
National Council is elected by federal rules, the Council of States is elected by 
Cantons with different rule of each one. 
 
Except for the Canton Jura which was detached from Bern in 1978,  other Swiss 
Cantons accepted to join the Confederation in 1848 next to the Constitution to 
which they ceded a part of sovereignty to the Confederation. Each Canton has its 
own constitutions, parliament, government and court.  The size of government 
varies from 58-200 seats and cantonal governments has 5, 7 or 9 members. 
 
There were about 3 211 Municipalities in 1860. Over a century, the number of 
Municipalities was slightly reduced to 3 095 in 1960, 3 001 in 1994 and 2 940 in 
1996. Recently, with the acceleration of fusion, the number of Municipalities was 
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about 2 636 in 2009. The decline is due to amalgamation, especially in the Canton 
Tessin and Fribourg.  
 
About one-fifth of communes has their own parliaments, four-fifth of municipal 
decisions are made by a process of direct democracy in local assembly. Citizens are 
invited to participate to local assembly (at least two annual sessions) where they 
can ask question, make proposal and vote on various subjects. Along with tasks 
which are entrusted by the Cantons and Confederation such as population register 
and civil protection, Municipalities also have their own competencies in various 
areas such as basic education, social affairs, energy supply, road building, local 
planning, and taxation. These powers are self-regulated or determined by the 
Canton, so they varies considerably from one Canton to another. 
 
4.1.2 Role of direct democracy  
 
The 1848 Constitution allowed the Swiss citizens launch initiatives and 
referendums as given in the Article 139-141, Chap 2 of the Constitution. This 
arrangement is also included in the cantonal constitutions of 26 Cantons. In fact, 
the direct democracy is executed at three levels of government, so that any change 
in public policy could be vetoed by such a system of democracy. The equalization 
system is also decided though a referendum which can be valid in according the 
principle of double majority: More than one half of voters and more than one half 
of Cantons.  
 
4.2 Assignment of public functions in Switzerland 
 
4.2.1 Assignment of competences 
 
The sovereign of Swiss Cantons is well defined at the Article 3 of the 1999 Federal 
Constitution «The Cantons are sovereign except to the extent that their sovereignty 
is limited by the Federal Constitution. They exercise all rights that are not vested in 
the Confederation». This constitutional arrangement is an important highlight of the 
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principle of subsidiarity in assigning responsibilities between the Confederation and 
the Cantons. It expresses that the public goods and services must be provided by 
the jurisdictions which are closest to their citizens. 
 
Under the provision of the federal Constitution, the Confederation has competences 
on: Foreign affairs, national security, customs duties, currency, civil law and 
criminal law. The Article 42 of the 1999 Federal Constitution defines the strict 
assignment of function to the Confederation «The Confederation shall fulfil the 
duties that are assigned to it by the Federal Constitution». 
 
In the case of Switzerland, Cantons can pass complementary legislation to 
accomplish federal laws on the field preserved constitutionally to the 
Confederation. The Article 43 of the 1999 Federal Constitution provides that «The 
Cantons decide on the duties that they must fulfil within the scope of their powers». 
Moreover, Cantons frequently carry out the tasks on behalf of the Confederation if 
these tasks have not been exercised by the Confederation. There are various fields 
which are identified as joint tasks for both levels of governments such as education, 
hospitals and prisons. Put differently, Cantons exercise as agencies of the 
Confederation in these fields. 
 
Cantons have full authority over their Municipalities within their territory and they 
decide also their autonomies. However, the level of autonomy varies considerably 
from one Canton to another. The responsivities of Municipalities are also defined 
by the Cantons with various fields such as social services, energy supply, local road 
and infrastructures, basic educations. 
 
4.2.2 Taxing power  
 
Under the constitutional arrangement, there are certain taxes which are exclusively 
levied by the Confederation such as consumption taxes (including VAT), custom 
duties and other duties. Nevertheless, the Constitution also stipulates a maximum 
tax rate that the Confederation can apply to VAT and other consumption taxes, 
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direct taxes on natural persons, investment return tax and capital tax.   Cantons are 
not allowed to collect tax on commodities which are exempted by the 
Confederation. Other main taxes are shared between Cantons and the Confederation 
such as personal income tax and corporate taxes. The graphic 4.1 shows the total 
tax revenue of the Confederation in which the consumption taxes make up 51 
percent, while the direct taxes on natural persons and on legal entities amount 
respectively to 15.7 and 13.8 percent of the total tax revenue.  
 
Graphic 4.1 Taxing power of the Confederation and Cantons 
 
Source: Calculated by author from Federal Department of Finances (2014). 
 
Swiss Cantons enjoy a considerable fiscal autonomy over their tax categories, their 
two most important resources are direct taxes on natural persons and transfer 
revenue which account respectively for 30.7 and 30 percent of their total revenue. 
The revenue from exchange transaction (user charges and fees) accounts for 8.6 
percent and direct taxes on legal entities for 8.5 percent of the total revenue of 
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Cantons. Under to the Federal Tax Harmonization Law (1990) that reinforce the 
cooperation between Cantons and the Confederation on the fiscal issue, there are 
some important taxes whose formulas of calculation are redefined. Particularly, the 
definition of tax base is now assimilated in all Cantons, however the tax rate can 
vary considerably from one Canton to another. After all, the intention of the Federal 
Tax Harmonization Law is to release partially the tax competition between Cantons, 
establish a yardstick tax competition and encourage the inter-cantonal cooperation 
with regard to the fiscal policy. 
 
Municipalities also have a significant competence on taxation field, especially the 
property tax, user charges and fees which they may define both the tax base and 
rate according to their proper choice and cantonal fiscal arrangement. The 
Municipalities main revenue resources are from direct taxes on persons (47 
percent), revenue from exchange transaction (19.6 percent) which is collected by 
applying the principle of causality and transfer revenue from the Confederation and 
Cantons (12.9 percent).   
 
4.2.3 Spending power 
 
The Confederation has a power on its spending decision, however, when the federal 
spending relating to the joint task competence, the Confederation has to take into 
consideration the preference of Cantons by a consulting process. Certain spending 
categories may be challenged by a referendum. Consequently, Swiss Cantons has 
an effective influence on the exercise of federal spending.  
 
The graphic 4.2 shows that the Confederation expenditure makes up 32.8 percent 
of the total general government budget across three levels of government. The 
Confederation allocates the largest amount to social security up to 27.5 percent of 
its expenditure budget.  Around 20.5 percent is devoted to finances and taxes and 
14.6 percent to transportation and communications from the Confederation budget. 
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The Cantons expenditures account for 43.9 percent of total public expenditure and 
the Municipalities for 23.3 percent. Three categories of expenditure which absorb 
61.8 percent of cantonal budgets are education (27.9 percent), social security (19.8 
percent) and healthcare (14.7 percent). For the Municipalities expenditure, 59.7 
percent of their budget is allocated to national economy, social security and general 
administration. Relating to domain of education, Municipalities are responsible for 
the spending for kindergartens and obligatory schools, while the Cantons are in 
charge of spending on professional schools and universities. As a result, the 
distribution of spending on education is 18.7 percent for the Confederation, 73.3 
percent for Cantons and 8 percent for Municipalities.  
 
Graphic 4.2 Spending power of the Confederation and Cantons 
 
Source: Calculated by author from Federal Department of Finances (2014). 
 
After the healthcare reform in 1994, the financing of healthcare are largely passed 
to the private sector in order to discharge the burden of public sector. The 
Confederation seems to be absent of direct financing the healthcare, however it is 
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responsible for establish a law framework for the Cantons and Municipalities which 
are charged with implementing policies.  
 
4.3 Former fiscal equalization in Switzerland 
 
In 1938, the first equalization program was implemented in Switzerland, then some 
conditional grant were allocated to Cantons in according to their tax capacities.  In 
1958, a particular article providing competence to the Confederation to form an 
official equalization mechanism, was introduced into the Constitution. Swiss 
Economist Christopher Hengan-Braun is considered the founding father of the 
equalization for the reason that he outlined the guidance for the designing of 
equalization programs which were implemented to reduce the fiscal disparities 
between Cantons. The Article 42 of the 1958 Constitution provides that: 
 
«The Confederation encourages financial equalization among the Cantons, in 
particular when federal subvention are granted, the financial capacity of the 
Cantons and situation of mountainous regions must be considered in an appropriate 
fashion» 
Article 42 of the 1958 Constitution.  
 
Next to the constitutional modification, a law on fiscal equalization was adopted on 
June 19, 1959. The law indicates that the main objective of such a program is to 
provide the Cantons with sufficient fund which allow them to produce certain 
public goods and service at a minimum acceptable level without increasing much 
on their tax burdens. The message of the law arms to correct fiscal imbalance which 
is a result of the difference between the tax raising capacity of the Cantons and the 
relative cost of providing public goods and services. 
 
To reduce the fiscal disparities between Cantons, the former fiscal equalization 
mechanism consisted of three financial transfer programs among which the two 
programs flow fiscal resources from the Confederation to the Cantons are federal 
grants and revenue sharing. The third program flowed in reserved direction from 
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the Cantons to the Confederation under form of contribution to social security. 
However, all three programs use the cantonal financial capacity as the only 
indicator to determine the volume of transfers.  
 
The latest version of the former formula for computing the financial capacity index 
dated in 1986 and had four components6. The process of calculation was extreme 
complex as well as there was no separation between the resource equalization and 
the expenditure (cost) equalization. In addition, the system neither resulted in a 
reduction of fiscal disparity between Cantons nor reinforced the fiscal autonomy if 
not make the beneficiary Cantons more dependence on the transfer from the 
Confederation.  
 
In 2001, the calculation resulted that Canton Zoug had a highest total index of 
financial capacity at 218 point which is 7.3 times higher than the Canton Valais 
with the lowest index at 30 points. This index was also used to integrate into other 
formulas determine federal transfers to Cantons: Conditional federal grant–in-aid, 
revenue sharing, withholding tax sharing. 
 
4.4 The present system of fiscal equalization in Switzerland 
 
A project of reform of the equalization was initiated by the federal department of 
finances in 1994. The conferences of cantonal directors of finances settled the 
principal objective is «The financial relations between the Confederation and 
Cantons must inspire the principle of subsidiarity as much as possible» (The Federal 
Council, 1994, cited in Eric Mottu, 1997). Years later, the issue was largely debated 
in the parliament, at the negotiation between Cantons and the Confederation. 
Meanwhile, a group of expert was in charge to examine the actual equalization 
system and provide technical consultations for the new scheme of fiscal 
equalization. Consequently, the group of experts concluded that the old system 
needed a profound reform because of these main reasons. 
 
                                                          
6 Consult the paper of Dafflon (2004) for more detail on the former formula. 
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 The actual system of equalization has not succeeded in reducing cantonal 
disparities; 
 
 Over the years, the system has become more and more entangled, blurring 
the actual responsibilities of the two layers, with too much centralization; 
 
 Part of the revenue equalization policy, especially the Cantons' 
contributions to social security expenditures, is inefficient; 
 
 The conditional grant system advantages the rich Cantons rather than the 
poor ones. Although the rates of matching grants are the higher the poorer 
the Canton, Cantons with low financial capacity have not been able to take 
advantage of this grant system because of their difficulty to fund their own 
part of the expenditure. Clearly stated, it does not make sense giving a 60 
per cent grant to a «low capacity» Canton for a specified function if it cannot 
find money for the remaining 40 per cent. In this case, straightforward 
revenue equalization without condition is obviously a better alternative;  
 
 There is a general confusion in the present system between incentive, 
efficiency and equalization.  
Source: Dafflon (2004). 
  
After some modifications, the project was adopted by the federal parliament in 
October 2003 and accepted by 65 percent of Swiss voters and by 22/26 Cantons in 
the popular referendum of November 2004. From January 2008, the new financial 
equalization was implemented. 
 
4.4.1 Elements of new equalization systems: Reassignment of functions 
 
The new equalization is precisely described in the 2001 Federal Message. At the 
beginning, the reform is based on two issues: Reform of fiscal equalization and 
reform of assignments of public functions. Put differently, the reform aimed at a 
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process of shifting the present fiscal equalization to a new one coupled with a 
reassignment of responsibilities between the Confederation and the Cantons.  
 
The reassignment of responsibilities is divided into three schemes: 
 A clear reassignment of tasks and financing between the Confederation and 
Cantons where: 7 exclusive function are assigned to the Confederation, 12 
joint-tasks are under responsibility of both the Confederation and the 
Cantons and 13 exclusive tasks belong to the Cantons; 
 For joint-task, a new form of collaboration between two layers of 
government in which the Confederation is responsible for outlining the laws 
while the Cantons take over the operation management and implement of 
policy. In this case, Cantons’ activities are characterized as agencies of the 
Confederation. 
 Cantons are obligated to collaborate through inter-cantonal agreement 
referred to 9 functions which are included in the Article 42 of the 
Constitution. The horizontal compensation of charge and cost for certain 
public services which benefit several Cantons. A more detail on new 
reassignment of function is showed in table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1  Reassignment of public functions between the Confederation and 
Cantons 
Functional 
classification 
of public 
expenditure 
in the 
harmonized 
public 
accounting 
system 
Exclusive federal Exclusive cantonal Joint federal-cantonal Inter-cantonal 
7 function 
(CF, 2001a: 45) 
13 functions 
(CF, 2001a: 45-46) 
12 functions 
(CF, 2001a: 47) 
9 functions 
(CF, 2001a: 48) 
1. Law and 
public order 
(1) Organization and 
equipment army; 
 (1) Cadastral 
measurement; 
 
(1) Penitentiaries; 
2. Education  (1) Scholarship and financial  aid at 
the second level education; 
(2) Sport activities at school; 
(3) Sport educational teaching 
schools and teaching material; 
(4) Education in specialized school 
for handicapped and disabled 
people; 
(2) Education grants in the 
service sector (partial); 
 
(2) Institutions for 
disabled; 
 
(3) Universities; 
(4) Professional 
high school; 
 
3. Culture and 
sport 
 
 
 
(2) Protection and 
conversation of 
historical buildings 
and sites of national 
importance; 
(5) Protection and conservation of 
historical buildings and sites of 
regional and local importance; 
 (5) Cultural 
institutions of 
inter-Cantonal 
importance; 
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(Continued) 
4. Health  (6) Individual welfare and for 
elderly people living in 
specialized or medical home; 
(3) Help to reduce illness 
insurance premium; 
 
(6) Specific 
medical care 
and specialized 
hospitals; 
5. Social aid 
 
 
(4) Old age pension; 
(5) Insurance for disabled 
people; 
(6) National institutions 
of care and help for 
old and disabled; 
(7) Housing in mountainous 
regions; 
(8) Medical and family help at 
domicile; 
(9) Grant –in-aid for the buildings 
and running costs of home and 
professional for disable people; 
 
 
(4) Complementary social 
aid for minimum 
living condition 
(partial); 
 
6. Transportatio
n and 
communicatio
ns 
(3) National roads and 
motorways; 
(10) «Normal» roads; 
(11) Technical improvement of 
regional and local traffic 
(5) Main roads, great 
projects; 
(6) Regional public 
transportation; 
(7) Airport; 
(7) Urban public 
transportation; 
7. Environment  (12) Protection against noise and air 
pollution; 
(13) Land zoning; 
(8) Flood protection; 
(9) Nature and landscape 
protection; 
(8) Sewage 
purification 
plants; 
(9) Waste 
disposal 
plants; 
8. Agricultural, 
forestry, 
industry, 
tourism and 
services 
(7) Castle and breeding;  (10) Hunting and fishing; 
(11) Forestry; 
(12) Agricultural 
structural 
improvement; 
 
Source: Dafflon (2004). 
 
4.4.2 Formulas of fiscal equalization 
 
Following to the reassignment of public function between the Confederation and 
Canton, a new scheme of fiscal equalization is conjointly designed and replaced the 
former one. This section is therefore devoted to examine the system of fiscal 
equalization which consists of three programs: Resource equalization, needs (cost) 
equalization and cohesion funds. 
 
4.4.2.1 Formulas of new equalization scheme  
A new formula is developed to calculate the financial capacity of each Canton. The 
objective aims at ensuring sufficient resource to Cantons so that they can fulfil the 
tasks that have been entrusted to them and reducing the financial disparities 
between Cantons. The formula is exclusively based on revenue resource on which 
the cantonal fiscal capacity is ranked on. 
 
To establish a ranking of cantonal financial capacities, it requires a financial 
resource indicator to replace the old one which were actually evaluated as 
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inadequate by both layers of governments and the group of experts. After certain 
technical corrections, the agreed formulas is outlined as being presented in the box 
4.1. The resource equalization between Cantons is therefore carried out in three 
following steps: 
 
 First, the «Aggregate Tax Base» is calculated by adding three components 
of federal direct taxes: The total taxable income of individual, wealth of 
individual and the taxable benefit of legal entities in the Canton in question 
respecting to the rules for taxes assessment of federal direct tax and not of 
cantonal rules. The revenue potential is the average of aggregation of three 
consecutive years. 
 
 Second, revenue potential indicator is fixed at 100 points for the national 
average. The Cantons revenue potential indicators of are the results of 
multiplying their revenue potential per capital to 100, then dividing to the 
national resource potential per capita.  
 
 Finally, the Cantons are classified in two groups according to whether their 
indicators are higher than the national average of 100 points or not. 
Consequently, the 26 Cantons are ranked from one to another into two 
categories. The Cantons with indicators >100 points are qualified as the 
Cantons with strong resource potential. These Cantons (Cantons «payers») 
make monetary payments to the fund, whereas the Cantons with indicator 
<100 points are qualified as the Cantons with weak resource potential. 
These Cantons (Cantons «beneficiaries») receive payments from the fund. 
The formula (4.2) and (4.3) are used to calculate the amount that one Canton 
pays to or receive from the fund. 
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Box 4.1 Formulas for resource equalization 
The Aggregate Tax Base is determined by the formula: 
  
Where: 
ATB      Aggregate Tax Base; 
i Canton i = 1, 2…26; 
R Total taxable income from physical taxpayers, after deduction of SFs 
23.300, without inter-cantonal repartition of the tax base if the taxpayer 
is active in several Cantons; + taxable income at source (cantonal tax 
bases for the federal direct tax FDT); 
PhP Physical person or individual; 
α Rate of return for W, without interest payment and dividend, α= 0.016 
which mean that 100 SFr is equal to 1.60 SFr of taxable income; 
W Wealth of physical person; 
B Total taxable benefit of corporate business entities with no tax 
advantages; 
Cor Corporate business entities; 
HOL1     Total taxable benefit of business entities with participation. 
β Factor of the correction which allows to calculate the taxable benefit for 
holding companies and financial companies; 
HOL2     Total benefit of holding companies and financial fund companies; 
POP Residential population. 
 
 Contribution of Cantons with financially strong resource potential is 
determined by the formula: 
  
Where:   
A Total contribution of Cantons with strong resource potential; 
(4.1) 
(4.2) 
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(Continued) 
Aq Contribution of q, the Canton with strong resource potential; 
Eq Average, for years taken into calculation, of the residential population 
of the Canton with strong resource potential; 
RIq Index of resources q, the Canton with strong resource potential; 
N Number of Cantons with strong resource potential. 
Source: Dafflon (2004). 
 
 Contributions paid to the Cantons with weak resource potential is 
determined by the formula: 
  
with the value of parameter q is fixed in according to the following equation:  
  
Where:  
B Total contribution paid to the Canton with weak resource potential; 
Br Contribution paid to r, the Canton with weak resource potential; 
Er Average, for years taken into calculation, of the residential population 
of the Canton with weak resource potential; 
RIr Index of resources q, the Canton with weak resource potential; 
m Number of Canton with weak resource potential; 
p Parameter (>0) indicate the strength of the progression; 
RImin Index of resource presenting the weakest resource potential; 
SSECH Standardized fiscal revenues of Switzerland; 
ECH Average, for years taken into calculation, of the residential population 
of Switzerland; 
Source: Confederation Suisse (2007), translation. 
 
(4.3) 
(4.4) 
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The table 4.2 regroups the result of all three equalization programs of Switzerland 
in 2015. Result of resource equalization is showed in the column (3) in which the 
resource equalization includes of two types of transfers according to their direction: 
The horizontal and vertical transfers.  The horizontal transfer indicates the flow of 
resource from the Cantons with strong resource potential to the Cantons with weak 
resource potential with respect to their resource indexes, while the vertical transfer 
flows from the Confederation to the Cantons with weak resource potential 
 
Table 4.2 Net compensation payments in 2015 
Can 
ton 
Resour
ce 
Index 
2015 
 
Resource equalization2015 Compensation for charges 2015 
Total of 
equalizat
ion   
instrume
nt 
Net 
compe
nsation 
of 
cohesio
n fund 
Total of net 
payment 2015 
Horizontal 
Vertical Total CCG 
CCS 
A-C 
CCS 
F Total Charge Relief Total 
SFs/in
habita
nt 
ZH 
BE 
LU 
UR 
SZ 
OW 
NW 
GL 
ZG 
FR 
SO 
BS 
BL 
SH 
AR 
AI 
SG 
GR 
AG 
TG 
TI 
VD 
VS 
NE 
GE 
JU 
119.5 
74.3 
79.6 
61.6 
165.9 
86.9 
130.5 
68.9 
261.4 
77.0 
78.3 
143.6 
100.1 
101.9 
84.4 
82.8 
79.0 
81.4 
89.2 
77.4 
98.5 
106.5 
68.8 
88.1 
144.9 
62.7 
465’182 
0 
0 
0 
166’246 
0 
21’413 
0 
314’985 
0 
0 
144’200 
684 
2’467 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
80’619 
0 
0 
356’417 
 
0 
-464’759 
-124’824 
-30’565 
0 
6’017 
0 
24’492 
0 
-111’393 
-93’131 
0 
0 
0 
-11’766 
-4’021 
-166’821 
-57’068 
-76’828 
-96’496 
-2’115 
0 
-198’829 
-25’358 
0 
-57’803 
0 
680’550 
-182’781 
-44’757 
0 
-8’810 
0 
-35’864 
0 
-163’113 
-136’372 
0 
0 
0 
-17’229 
-5’888 
-244’278 
-83’565 
-112’499 
-141’301 
-3’097 
0 
-291’147 
-37’132 
0 
-84’641 
465’182 
-1 145’309 
-307’605 
-75’323 
166’264 
-14’827 
21’413 
-60’357 
314’985 
-274’506 
-229’503 
144’200 
684 
2’467 
-28’995 
-9’909 
-411’099 
-140’633 
-189’327 
-237’797 
-5’212 
80’619 
-489’975 
-62’490 
356’471 
-142’443 
0 
-28’112 
-6’589 
-11’690 
-6’825 
-6’279 
-1’270 
-5’406 
0 
-9’259 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-19’086 
-8’436 
-1’812 
-138’182 
0 
-3’737 
-14’403 
0 
-74’245 
-23'147 
0 
-4'455 
-2’711 
-23’541 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-1’854 
-36’295 
0 
-1 533 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-20’386 
-64’718 
0 
-15’575 
-74’812 
-532 
-65'694 
-120 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-19'016 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-3'745 
0 
0 
-32'402 
0 
-68’405 
-51’774 
-6’589 
-11’690 
-6’825 
-6’279 
-1’270 
-5’406 
0 
-9’259 
-1’854 
-55’310 
0 
-1 533 
-19 086 
-8 436 
-1 812 
-138 182 
0 
-3’737 
-34’789 
-68’463 
-74’245 
-38’722 
-107’214 
-4 986 
396’777 
-1 197’082 
-314’194 
-87’013 
159’439 
-21’106 
20’143 
-65’763 
314’985 
-283’765 
-231’357 
88’889 
684 
934 
-48’080 
-18’345 
412’912 
-278’815 
-189’327 
-241’534 
-40’001 
12’156 
-564’220 
-101’212 
249’257 
-1’47’430 
20’251 
-36’334 
-17’963 
574 
2’120 
-8’908 
621 
-7’533 
1'628 
-133'346 
4'024 
3'192 
4'264 
1'216 
886 
243 
7'438 
3'128 
8'967 
3'773 
5'092 
10'420 
4'529 
-106'069 
6'772 
-18'268 
417’028 
-1 233’416 
-332’157 
-86’438 
161’559 
-30’014 
20’755 
-73’296 
316’613 
-417’111 
-227’333 
92’082 
4’948 
2’150 
-47 195 
-18 103 
-405’474 
-275’687 
-180’360 
-237’761 
-34’909 
22’576 
-559’691 
-207’280 
256’029 
-165’698 
302 
-1’253 
-883 
-2’463 
1’108 
-849 
511 
-1’892 
2’806 
-1’496 
-894 
481 
18 
28 
-892 
-1 153 
-847 
-1’398 
-297 
-960 
-104 
32 
-1’792 
-1’200 
558 
-2 388 
CH 100.0 1’552’285 -1’552’285  -2’273’025  -2’273’025  -362’933 -241’955 -120’978  -725’866   -2’998'891   -239’292  -3’238’182 -410 
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Source: Administration des Finances (2015), translation. 
 
The column (2) presents the resource indexes which is used to calculate the amount 
of resource equalization to each Canton. The Cantons with resource indexes above 
100 points will finance those with resource indexes below 100 points. The transfer 
will be executed horizontally between Cantons. In the next stage, the Confederation 
will make the transfer vertically in such a way that allow the Cantons with weak 
resource potential to attain the predetermined objective of 85 percent of the national 
average. 
 
In 2015, the total amount of resource equalization is up to SFs 3 835 million. Ten 
Cantons with strong resource potential contribute SFs 1 552 million plus the 
Confederation with SFs 2 273 million to finance sixteen Cantons with weak 
resource index. Three Cantons contribute most to horizontal payment are Zurich, 
Geneva and Zoug, while the Canton Jura, Bern and Valais receive the highest 
amounts. Bern, Valais and Saint-Gall receive largest financial allocations from the 
Confederation for resource equalization.  
 
4.4.2.2 Formula and results of compensation of excessive charges  
The question is how to design a system of compensation for the additional cost due 
to natural factors such as: Altitude, ground declivity, low population density, 
mountainous regions or distance to service delivery which lead to raise the unit cost 
of public service production. This operation is completely different from the 
resource equalization, the cost equalization have two components:  
 
i. Compensation for additional costs due to geographical and 
topographical factors (CCG) 
The additional cost generalized from the production of cantonal public service for 
geographical and topographical reasons.  The cost of production is usually higher 
in the Cantons with more mountainous area, higher cost for service delivery to 
population living on mountainous area and cost due to the structure of population. 
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Three categories are selected with four respective components are weighted 
differently as being presented in the table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3 Determination of criteria and weighting for CCG 
Category Criteria Weighting 
Surface area Altitude (without unproductive surfaces) > 1’080m 33 percent 
Population Living on altitude  > 800m 33 percent 
Structure of 
Population 
Localities less than 200 inhabitants 16.7 percent 
Low demographic density 16.7 percent 
Source: Adapted by author from Conseil Fédéral (2001), translation. 
 
The national average for each series is given at 100 points. After the calculation, if 
the index of charges of one Canton is higher than 100 points of national average, it 
would receive compensation taking the form of conditional block grants as 
compensation for the excessive charge dues to CCG. Beneficiary Cantons are free 
to decide to which of three functions it would allocate the total amount of 
compensation. The statistic of surface area, population and households are used as 
base for the calculation of index of charge. 
 
The table 4.4 shows the amount of CCG according to the weighting of four 
disability criteria. In 2015, there are seventeen Cantons qualified to receive the 
payment from CCG. Three Cantons: Grisons, Valais and Bern receive largest 
amounts from this compensation (see table 4.2, column (4)). 
 
Table 4.4 Distribution of CCG according to criteria – 2015 
Compensation for additional costs due to geographical and topographical factors (CCG) 
Surface area Population Structure of population 
Surface area situate  
above the altitude of   
1’080m  (without  
unproductive surfaces) 
 
Weighting 33.3% 
SFs 120.9 million 
Population live  
above  the altitude of  
800m 
 
 
Weighting 33.3% 
SFs 120.9 million 
Localities of less  
than 200  
inhabitants 
 
 
Weighting 16.7% 
SFs 60.4 million 
Low demographic 
Density 
 
 
 
Weighting 16.7% 
SFs 60.4 million 
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Source: Adapted by author from Département Fédéral des Finances (2015), 
translation. 
 
ii. Compensation for additional charges due to socio-demographical 
factors (CCS) 
The second part of cost equalization is implemented by the Confederation aiming 
at compensate additional charges for the central cities which support generally a 
higher charges due to socio-demographic factors of population structure. According 
to the common sense, the urban cities have a higher proportion of aged persons, the 
poor, nonparent family, dependent persons, students, unemployment, and 
foreigners. These groups would cause to a higher charge because they pay little of 
taxes and require more of public services. The CCS consists of two formulas 
respectively to two types of compensation. 
 
CCS for Structure of the population (domain A to C):  The calculation of « 
determinant excessive charges » due to the structure of the based on three partial 
indicators: «Poverty», «structure of age» and «integration of foreigners». The 
population and social aid statistics are employed to the calculation. On the contrary 
to the CCG, indicators are aggregated with an analysis of some principal 
components to establish a global index of charges. Canton with positive index of 
charge in comparison to the national average will receive proportionally the amount 
of transfer for excessive charges of CCS. The determinant excessive charges are 
result of multiplying the index of charge by determinant population. Only Cantons 
with positive index of charge present the determinant excessive charges. The 
payments are proportional to determinant excessive charges. The weighting for 
domain A-C is at 66.6 percent of the total payment. 
 
CCS for City Center (domain F): First, the «determinant excessive charges» are 
calculated on the statistic base of Municipalities due to three partial indicators: 
«population of municipality», «density of population» and the «employment rate» 
which are weighted by an analysis of principal components. Second, the 
standardized indicators of Municipalities are aggregated at the cantonal level and 
put in relation with the permanent resident population of the Canton in question in 
94 
 
 
 
order to form a global index of charges. The coefficient of charges is the difference 
between the index of charges of Canton and the lowest index of charges of all 
Cantons. The payments are proportional to the determinant excessive charges. The 
weighting for this domain F accounts for 33.3 percent of the total payment. 
 
The result of CCS is presented in the of the table 4.2 column (4) where another SFs 
363 million is engaged to finance CCS.  Two-thirds of the compensation fund is 
allocated to the CCG for the domains A to E with as amount of SFs 241.9 million, 
the remaining one-third is allocated the CCS for the domains F with an amount of 
SFs 120.9 million. In 2015, ten Cantons are qualified to receive the compensation 
from CCS (Domain A-C) in which the Canton Geneva, Vaud and Basel receive the 
highest transfers, while four Cantons receive payments from CCS (Domain F) are 
the Zurich, Geneva, Bale-Ville and Tessin.  
 
Regarding to the total amount of compensation, there are three Cantons receiving 
most of transfer are Grisons, Geneva and  Valais in which Grisons and Valais 
receive only from CCG while Geneva receive transfer from CCS for both domain 
A-C and F. Three Cantons do not receive any transfer from compensation of 
excessive charge are: Zoug, Bale-Campagne and Argovie. 
 
4.4.2.3 Cohesion funds 
The change from old system of equalization to the new one has a disadvantaged 
effect on several Cantons, especially on the financial flux between the 
Confederation and the Cantons, between the Cantons themselves. This kind of 
compensation aimed at facilitating the shifting to the news system so the 
Confederation and Cantons have concluded the necessity for such compensation to 
the Cantons with weak resource potential. Because a shifting to the new system 
creates certain circumstances where they benefit less of financial means in 
comparison to the old system. 
 
An amount of SFs 359 million were used to fund the cohesion fund which are 
contributed by the Confederation for two-third (SFs 239 million) and by the 
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Cantons with strong resource potentials for one-third (SFs 120 million). The 
financing of fund will be outdated after 24 years and reconsidered each four years. 
Once a beneficiary Canton is above the national average of 100 points, it would not 
no longer receive the payment. In 2015, there are seven Cantons which are eligible 
for the payment from the fund. The table 4.2 column (6) gives net compensation of 
cohesion fund. 
 
4.5 Performance of Swiss fiscal equalization 
 
The predetermined objective is to allow the Cantons with financially weak capacity 
to raise the resource revenue until 85 percent of the national average after resource 
equalization.  The payments is under form of block grant and not earn-marked. As 
the table 4.5 shows that the resource potential index has been increased 
considerably after resource equalization taking effect. The Canton Uri with the 
lowest index at 61.6 points has been raised to 86.8 points, an increase of 25.2 points, 
while the strongest Canton Zoug with the highest index is reduced from 261.4 point 
to 228.6 points (a fall of 32.8 points). In term of monetary value, three Cantons with 
weakest index Uri, Jura and Valais receive correspondingly SFs 2 146, SFs 2 053 
and SFs 1 569 per habitant while the three strongest Cantons: Zoug, Schwytz and 
Geneva contribute SFs 2 792, SFs 1 140 and SFs 777 respectively to the resource 
equalization funds. Horizontal transfer has considerably reduced the fiscal disparity 
between Cantons since the introduction of new mechanism in 2008. There were two 
years where the objective was not reached after effective equalization for example: 
The Canton Jura 84.7 (2010) and 83.5 (2011), Canton Uri with index of 84.4 (2010) 
and 83.3 (2011). From 2012 until this present, observation shows a convergence of 
cantonal resource indexes and even the objective is passed until 86.8 points in the 
Canton with lowest index.  
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Table 4.5 Resource index before and after equalization 
 
(+) charge for the Canton, (-) Relief for the Canton 
 Resource equalization 2015 
 
Horizontal 
 
Vertical  
Index SFR 
after fiscal 
equalization 
Resource 
index 2015 
Amounts  
paid 
Amounts 
received 
Amounts 
received Total 
 
Points In SFs 1 000 In SFs 1 000 
In SFs  
1 000 
In SFs  
1 000 
 
Points 
ZH 
BE 
LU 
UR 
SZ 
OW 
NW 
GL 
ZG 
FR 
SO 
BS 
BL 
SH 
AR 
AI 
SG 
GR 
AG 
TG 
TI 
VD 
VS 
NE 
GE 
JU 
119.5 
74.3 
79.6 
61.6 
165.9 
86.9 
30.5 
68.9 
261.4 
77.0 
78.3 
143.6 
100.1 
101.9 
84.4 
82.8 
79.0 
81.4 
89.2 
77.4 
98.5 
106.5 
68.8 
88.1 
144.9 
62.7 
465’182 
0 
0 
0 
166’246 
0 
21’413 
0 
314’985 
0 
0 
144’200 
684 
2’467 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
80’619 
0 
0 
356’417 
 
0 
-464’759 
-124’824 
-30’565 
0 
6’017 
0 
24’492 
0 
-111’393 
-93’131 
0 
0 
0 
-11’766 
-4’021 
-166’821 
-57’068 
-76’828 
-96’496 
-2’115 
0 
-198’829 
-25’358 
0 
-57’803 
 
0 
680’550 
-182’781 
-44’757 
0 
-8’810 
0 
-35’864 
0 
-163’113 
-136’372 
0 
0 
0 
-17’229 
-5’888 
-244’278 
-83’565 
-112’499 
-141’301 
-3’097 
0 
-291’147 
-37’132 
0 
-84’641 
465’182 
-1 145’309 
-307’605 
-75’323 
166’264 
-14’827 
21’413 
-60’357 
314’985 
-274’506 
-229’503 
144’200 
684 
2’467 
-28’995 
-9’909 
-411’099 
-140’633 
-189’327 
-237’797 
-5’212 
80’619 
-489’975 
-62’490 
356’471 
-142’443 
115.5 
88.0 
89.3 
86.8 
152.5 
91.8 
124.3 
87.2 
228.6 
88.6 
88.9 
134.7 
100.1 
101.5 
90.8 
90.2 
89.1 
89.8 
92.9 
88.7 
98.7 
105.2 
87.2 
92.3 
135.8 
86.9 
CH 100.0 1’552’285 -1’552’285   -2’273’025 -2’273’025 86.9 
SFR= Standardized fiscal revenue 
Source: Federal Department of Finance (2015). 
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As for the compensation of excessive charge: Contrary to the resource equalization 
in which the objective is well defined.  Therefore, it is possible to compare the 
situation of each Canton before and after equalization in referring to the 
predetermined objective. There are two reasons which explain why the evaluation 
of performance for the compensation of excessive charge is difficult.  First, because 
the ad-hoc variables method does not require the fixing standard level of 
expenditure of each Canton. Second, as the beneficiary Cantons are free to spend 
on what domain that they prefer to. So that, an analysis which sets out a necessary 
benchmark can permit to evaluate the performance of this kind of transfer (Dafflon, 
2010, p.31). Notwithstanding this difficulty, it is desirable to consider the amount 
per capita that is paid to beneficiary Cantons: In 2015, twenty three Cantons 
received an average amount of SFs 93 per capita. The Canton Grisons received the 
highest amount with SFs 716 per capita, Appenzell Rh-Int with SFs 545 and 
Appenzell Rh-Ext with SFs 358. Three Cantons receive the lowest transfers are: 
Soleure with SF 1, Saint-Gall with SFs 5 and Thurgovie with SFs 16.  
 
A different way to view the performance is to consider the net transfer per capita of 
all the equalization transfer consisting of resource equalization, compensation for 
excessive charge and cohesion fund. The three Cantons of Uri, Jura and Valais 
receive the highest amounts per inhabitant with SFs 2 463, SFs 2 238 and SFs 1 792 
respectively, while the three Cantons: Zoug, Schwytz and Geneva contribute the 
highest amounts with SFs 2 806, SFs 1 108 and SFs 550 correspondingly. Besides, 
other seven Cantons receive, each one an amount above SFs 1 000. More detail is 
figured in the last column of table 4.2. 
 
Another way to evaluate performance of equalization mechanism is to compare the 
Gini coefficient before and after equalization. Gini coefficient is reduced from 0.15 
to 0.11 in 2005 and from 0.17 to 0.11 in 2012. In comparison to the performance of 
Australia and Germany, before equalization the fiscal disparity between regions are 
3 times higher than those of Australia and Germany, after equalization the 
redistributive effect remains modest. The same for ratio of highest to lowest tax-
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raising equalization, this ratio is reduced from 3.8 to 2.5 in 2005 and from 4.3 to 
2.6 in 2012 after equalization (Hansjörg Blöchliger, 2014, p.8). 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
In general, the new system of financial equalization is economically and politically 
welcomed. First, it has reinforced the autonomy of Cantons by a clearer 
reassignment of public functions, discharge the overlapping of tasks between two 
layers of government and encourage the inter-cantonal cooperation. Secondly, the 
new equalization scheme has precisely separated the resource equalization and need 
equalization. In comparison to the old fiscal capacity index, the resource index is 
based purely on the representative tax system. The formula which is integrated in 
the process of calculation is more comprehensible and less complex than the old 
one.  
 
Around 80 percent of equalization fund is allocated through resource equalization 
program. However, certain Cantons of «payers» claim that their parts of 
contribution should be reduced as all Cantons of «beneficiaries» have already 
reached the national average, though the total fund for three programs of 
equalization is relatively small (equal 0.78 percent of GDP). The problem raised 
again when the Council of States refused to cut down partially the contribution of 
Cantons with strong resource potential.  In the other hand, the implement of new 
equalization scheme was reacted by a strategic behavior of both Cantons of 
contributors and of beneficiaries. In 2005, some financially weak Cantons have 
decided to lower their tax or abolish certain local taxes. As consequence, the fiscal 
competition is intensified.  
 
Main principles and formulas are generally satisfied under economic view. 
However, some criteria are under political debates. Furthermore, interest groups 
and lobbyists find some ways to influence on the criteria such as the domain B of 
CCS where the altitude of 1080m may make no sense, as external expert comments 
«One cannot avoid the suspicion that this element has been chosen in an ad hoc 
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manner so as to advantage certain alpine Cantons compared to the actual situation. 
We do not understand this criterion of cantonal area above 1080 m alt. with a weight 
of 0.50 […] It is not justified that the total area above this altitude be taken into 
consideration. What are the additional charges that glaciers and rocky mountain 
cost to these Cantons? » (Frey, 2001, p. 17, cited in Dafflon, 2004). Following to 
the new system of equalization at the national level, most of Cantons have already 
implemented their own equalization between the Municipalities. The principles are 
remained, however the formulas and criteria vary considerably from one to another 
Canton.   
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